People are more than the sum of their parts and unfortunately, so is the discrimination they face. This observation was put forward by the scholar and advocate Kimberlé Crenshaw in a study addressing the discrimination faced by Black women in America and showing how it differs from merely a sum of sexism (also experienced by white women) and racism (also experienced by white men).[1] It has led to the development of the concept of “intersectionality,” a framework in which the different types of discriminations faced by an individual or group are understood as “overlapping and mutually constitutive rather that isolated and distinct.”[2]
How, if at all, does this concept play a role when considering issues of equality and discrimination under the Charter in Canada? After all, to establish whether discrimination exists, the framework set by section 15(1) relies on individual, siloed grounds—be they enumerated (race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability) or analogous (non-citizenship,[3] marital status,[4] sexual orientation,[5] Aboriginality-residence,[6] and non-resident status in a self-governing Indigenous community[7]) grounds. This was one of the central questions tackled by the Supreme Court of Canada in Québec (AG) v Kanyinda, 2026 SCC 7.