Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of September 29, 2025
CIVIL DECISIONS
Whitehead v. Tucker, 2025 ONCA 674
[Roberts, Miller and Zarnett JJ.A.]
Counsel:
P Ingrassia, for the appellants
E. Argentino and S. Barclay, for the respondents
Keywords: Torts, Real Property, Nuisance, Civil Procedure, Mandatory Orders, Enforcement, Contempt, Appeals, Standard of Review, Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Baxter Travenol Laboratories of Canada Ltd. v. Cutter (Canada) Ltd., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 388, Toneguzzo-Norvell (Guardian ad litem of) v. Burnaby Hospital, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 114, Vidéotron Ltée v. Industries Microlec Produits Électroniques Inc., [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1065, Waxman v. Waxman, (2004) 186 O.A.C. 201 (C.A.), Austin v. Bell Canada, 2020 ONCA 142, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Corkery, 2009 ONCA 85, Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799, Moncur v. Plante, 2021 ONCA 462, Schafer v. Schafer, 2025 ABCA 99, Miner v. Cooke, 2025 ABCA 226, Sweda Farms Ltd. v. Ontario Egg Producers, 2011 ONSC 3650, Culligan Canada Ltd. v. Fettes, 2010 SKCA 151
facts:
The parties have been neighbours for 25 years. For almost all that time, they have been engaged in a dispute about the respondents’ interference with the flow and drainage of water from the appellants’ adjacent property.
The appellants commenced an action against the respondents by way of statement of claim issued on February 11, 2003. They obtained judgment against the respondents on February 2, 2012. Among other things, the respondents were enjoined from interfering with the flow of water from the appellants’ property and ordered to take steps within three months of the 2012 judgment to restore it, failing which the appellants could bring a motion for contempt. The appellants brought a motion before the trial judge in 2024 for an order that the respondents were in contempt of the 2012 judgment. The appellants’ motion was dismissed with costs to the respondents of $25,000. The appellants appealed the dismissal of their contempt motion against the respondents.
issues:
1. Did the motion judge err and misinterpret the intent of the 2012 judgment?
2. Did the motion judge err by misapprehending the appellants’ expert evidence and admissions from respondents’ counsel that the respondents were not in compliance with the 2012 judgment?
3. Did the motion judge err in misapplying the legal test for civil contempt?
4. If the motion judge erred, what order should the Court substitute?
holding:
Appeal allowed.
reasoning:
(1) Did the motion judge err and misinterpret the intent of the 2012 judgment?
Yes, and in doing so, undermined its purpose. First, the motion judge interpreted the 2012 judgment in a manner that ignored the evidence that he accepted and his findings at the 2012 trial. In 2012, the motion judge had accepted the undisputed evidence that until the respondents had interfered with the water drainage by not only crushing the pipe but also by dramatically changing the slope of their driveway and installing a rubber dam on their property, the appellants did not have a drainage problem. The Court found that the solutions proposed by the appellants were not, as the motion judge suggested in his endorsement, aimed at improving the appellants’ drainage to a level not previously enjoyed prior to the respondents’ modifications to the property. Rather, the solutions were aimed at resolving the problem created by the material changes carried out by the respondents, including the damage to the pipe. The Court found that the only way that the appellants could have been returned to their position before the respondents’ interference was by the implementation of the recommendations of the appellants’ expert.
(2) Did the motion judge err by misapprehending the appellants’ expert evidence and admissions from respondents’ counsel that the respondents were not in compliance with the 2012 judgment?
Yes. The motion judge’s misinterpretation of the 2012 judgment represented a material misapprehension of or failure to consider his previous findings and the effect of the undisputed evidence that was accepted at the 2012 trial. The Court also accepted the appellants’ submission that the motion judge similarly misapprehended the effect of the evidence filed on the contempt motion in a way that was inconsistent with the 2012 trial findings and judgment. The Court noted that appellate intervention is justified where a judge has ignored conclusive or relevant evidence, has misunderstood the evidence, or has drawn erroneous conclusions from it. Where a finding is in conflict with accepted evidence and there is no given reason for failing to take such evidence into account, that can amount to a palpable and overriding error of fact. Having accepted the expert evidence and absent fresh or different expert evidence, it was not open to the motion judge to make a finding contrary to the findings that supported the 2012 judgment. The Court did not accept the respondents’ submission that the appellants had taken steps following the 2012 judgment that contributed to the drainage problem. Even if the appellants had made changes to their property, there was no expert evidence that these steps contributed to the drainage problem and the expert evidence filed by the parties did not identify any such changes as contributing to the drainage problem. The motion judge had also erred in failing to give effect to the respondents’ admissions that informed the 2012 judgment and supported the appellants’ expert evidence. Accordingly, the motion judge erred in misapprehending the evidence.
(3) Did the motion judge err in misapplying the legal test for civil contempt?
Yes, as a result of the misinterpretation of the 2012 judgment. The 2012 judgment contained very broad language as to what the respondents were required to do to restore the flow of water across the Whitehead property. The Court noted that based on the acceptance of the appellants’ expert evidence and the factual findings at trial, the motion judge’s conclusion on the contempt motion that simply replacing the damaged pipe complied with the 2012 judgment was manifestly wrong, because doing so was insufficient to restore the flow of water. The Court noted that the absence of specifications in the judgment did not, by itself, relieve the respondents from proper compliance. The 2012 judgment was clear and unequivocal: the respondents had to restore the flow of water. How the respondents accomplished that requirement was open-ended, but the requirement still had to be met. The Court reaffirmed that the evidence before the motion judge demonstrated that the steps taken by the respondents was inadequate to restore the flow of water as required under the 2012 judgment. As a result of the misinterpretation of the 2012 judgment, the motion judge misapplied the concept of deliberateness. In the case of restoring the flow of water, deliberateness for the purpose of determining civil contempt meant that the respondents must have intentionally failed to do what the judgment compelled, namely, failed to have taken the requisite steps to restore the flow of water. The Court found that in this way, the respondents intentionally chose not only to disregard the solution offered by the appellants’ expert, but to disobey the 2012 judgment. Accordingly, the Court found that by accepting the appellants’ expert evidence, the motion judge found as a fact at the trial that one of the reasons for the drainage problem was the respondents’ installation of the rubber dam on their property, and the respondents had failed to remove the rubber dam. As a result, the respondents deliberately failed to comply with paragraph 3 of the judgment. The motion judge erred in failing to give effect to paragraph 3 of the judgment.
(4) If the motion judge erred, what order should this court substitute?
Notwithstanding the respondents’ deliberate failure to comply with the 2012 judgment, a contempt order did not necessarily follow. The Court considered whether it was necessary to make a finding of contempt or an order that the party breached the order and should comply with it. As a result of the misinterpretation of the 2012 judgment, the Court found that the motion judge erred in failing to consider whether an order short of a contempt order would be appropriate to ensure compliance with the 2012 judgment. The Court found that it was clear from the undisputed evidence that the respondents had not restored the flow of water, such as by taking the requisite steps as recommended by the appellants’ expert, including the removal of the rubber dam on their property. The Court stated that the respondents should be required to do so without further delay and made a detailed order requiring the respondents to comply with the order, failing which the appellants could do the work themselves at the respondents’ expense. In an unusual step, the Court remained seized of the matter to case manage it to ensure compliance with its order.
Patel v. 2811230 Ontario Ltd., 2025 ONCA 679
[Gillese, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.]
Counsel:
A. Chaly, acting in person for the appellants G. Cohen, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment
facts:
The respondent held a mortgage of $392,000 against a property owned by 2811230 Ontario Ltd. (“281”). By letter, the respondent committed to lend 281 the mortgage sum. The funds were advanced and registered, though the respondent failed to sign the commitment letter. The appellants made required payments during the one-year term, but made no payments after maturity, leaving the mortgage unpaid with interest accruing. 281 had purchased the property for resale, made improvements, listed it for sale, and the respondent took no immediate enforcement steps after maturity, anticipating payment from a sale. When no sale occurred, the respondent started an action for payment and possession. By way of summary judgment, the respondent obtained orders for foreclosure, payment, possession, and leave to issue a writ of possession.
The motion judge rejected the appellants’ contention that the unsigned mortgage commitment negated the debt obligation, finding the commitment fully executed by payment and registration. The motion judge also rejected claims of an intentional lack of signature and fraud of the respondent’s driver’s license, noting the appellants failed to provide evidence. The motion judge dismissed the argument that a lease with a tenant barred foreclosure, stating foreclosures relate to the chargor and chargee, and any order would be subject to a legitimate tenant’s possessory rights. The motion judge found the argument about the standard charge term permitting possession on default failed, as the commitment letter was valid. The motion judge found no suggestion of violence in the respondent’s taking of possession and deemed any trespass claim irrelevant to foreclosure. The motion judge rejected the claim that the respondent failed to act with due diligence regarding renewal, as the commitment letter did not provide for automatic renewal and there was no evidence the appellants were misled. The motion judge finally dismissed the appellants’ counterclaim regarding lack of information about renewal, finding no supporting evidence.
issues:
Did the motion judge err in the reasoning of all the issues previously argued by the appellant?
holding:
Appeal dismissed.
reasoning:
No. The Court did not accept the appellant’s submission that the mortgage was invalid because the respondent had not signed the commitment letter. The Court stated that the appellants did not point to any alleged errors of fact or law in the motion judge’s determination of this matter. They reiterated the arguments that the absence of the respondent’s signature renders the mortgage invalid. The Court rejected this submission for the same reasons given by the motion judge. In terms of the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellants in their factum, the Court found that none provided a basis for appellate intervention.
Fang v. Yin, 2025 ONCA 682
[Gillese, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.]
Counsel:
A. Asgarali and K. Gu, for the appellant R. He, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Partnerships, Breach of Contract, Partnership Agreements, Civil Procedure, Procedural Fairness, Natural Justice, Summary Judgment, Injunctions, Counterclaims, Rental Property, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 20.04 (2.2) and 20.04(3)
facts:
The appellant, HJY, and the respondent, YF, entered into a contract to purchase a property in Scarborough and develop it into student rental housing. Both parties paid towards the property’s purchase price and renovation costs, but only HJY’s name was on title. Although the contract stated that a $500,000 mortgage would be placed on the property, HJY obtained mortgages for $800,000 and over $1 million. The most recent mortgage remained undischarged during litigation. Once construction was mostly completed, YF moved into the property with her son. HJY eventually attempted to evict her, claiming that she was a mere tenant and not a part owner. YF alleged that HJY harassed and physically assaulted her while trying to force her off the property.
The parties’ dispute centred on whether they had a partnership agreement, or whether YF only agreed to lend HJY money to buy the property. YF brought an action seeking declarations that the contract was a partnership agreement, establishing her ownership interest, and holding HJY solely responsible for the undischarged mortgage. She also sought a permanent injunction preventing HJY from harassing her or interfering with her enjoyment of the property, as well as damages for her financial losses. HJY brought a “mirror image” counterclaim in which he sought declarations that YF had only loaned him money and was a mere tenant, along with damages for slander of title. He argued that the agreement was invalid since the third business partner had not signed it. HJY denied assaulting YF and accused her of making false police complaints to intimidate him.
The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of YF and dismissed HJY’s counterclaim. She determined that there were no genuine issues requiring a trial since any credibility issues regarding the existence of a partnership were resolvable on the written record. The motion judge found that the contract was a valid partnership agreement. HJY’s assertion that YF loaned him money without expecting an interest in the property was not credible and was undermined by evidence including HJY’s own text messages. The motion judge further found that HJY breached the agreement, including via the mortgages he obtained for far higher amounts than was agreed upon. Noting that YF’s assault and harassment claims could not be determined on the written record alone, the motion judge held a mini-trial pursuant to r.20.04(2.2) of the Rules. After hearing oral testimony, she concluded that the harassment and assault allegations were made out. The motion judge ultimately declared that YF held a 50 percent interest in the property by resulting trust and granted the requested injunctive relief. Regarding damages, the motion judge ordered a reference to determine the appropriate quantum for HJY’s unauthorized property mortgaging, since the written record lacked crucial evidence including the current balance on the outstanding mortgage.
issues:
1. Did the motion judge err in denying HJY procedural fairness and natural justice by stating, at the start of her reasons, that HJY had assaulted YF?
2. Did the motion judge err in improperly interpreting text messages between the parties?
3. Did the motion judge err in deciding the dispute by way of summary judgment?
4. Did the motion judge err in ordering a permanent injunction preventing HJY from interfering with YF’s use and enjoyment of the property?
5. Did the motion judge err in directing a reference to determine the quantum of damages for HJY’s unauthorized mortgaging of the property?
6. Did the motion judge err in dismissing HJY’s counterclaim?
holding:
Appeal dismissed.
reasoning:
1. No. The Court deemed this submission baseless. Given that YF pleaded that HJY had assaulted her, the issue of assault was squarely before the motion judge and a topic she had to address in assessing the requested injunction. The motion judge was entitled to find that HJY assaulted YF on the evidence and made this finding after hearing both parties’ viva voce evidence. Her choice to mention this conclusion in the overview of her reasons in no way indicated that she prejudged the matter or treated HJY unfairly. 2. No. HJY submitted that the motion judge misinterpreted text messages that had been translated from Mandarin to English, arguing that she improperly inserted and omitted words when referencing the messages in her reasons. The Court held that there was no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s interpretation of the texts, emphasizing the deferential standard of review. The motion judge’s insertion of words in square brackets was part of her reading of the messages in the context of the record. No palpable and overriding errors were shown. 3. No. HJY alleged that summary judgment was inappropriate because the “entire evidentiary record was in dispute.” He contended that the court should have heard testimony from translators as to ambiguities in the meaning of relevant documents in Mandarin. This submission was also meritless. The Court pointed out that the motion judge turned her mind to the appropriateness of summary judgment and concluded that credibility issues concerning the parties’ business arrangements could be resolved from the written record. The motion judge explained why she preferred YF’s version of events, indicating that HJY’s evidence was inconsistent. She further explained that the credibility contest between the parties was largely illusory and resulted from HJY’s bald allegations. The Court saw no reviewable error in her approach. 4. No. There was no basis for appellate intervention in the permanent injunction order. It was supported by the motion judge’s findings that HJY was aggressive towards and physically assaulted YF when trying to evict her. 5. No. The Court saw no error in the motion judge’s decision to order a reference to determine damages, rejecting HJY’s contention that YF had to claim an accounting for the motion judge to have jurisdiction to order a reference. This jurisdiction came from r. 20.04(3). HJY could not complain of the consequences of his own failure to provide evidence of his expenses. 6. No. The motion judge committed no reviewable error in dismissing the counterclaim. The dismissal was supported by factual findings she made in YF’s favour.
HSBC Bank Canada v. Guido, 2025 ONCA 684
[Lauwers, Paciocco and Dawe JJ.A.]
Counsel:
A. McBride and D. Michaud-Shields, for the appellant D. E. Palter and J. Svirsky, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Guarantees, Substantial Indemnity Costs, Enforcement, Authority, Adverse Inference, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20.08, Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited v. Eaton Equipment Ltd., 2024 ONCA 25, HSBC Bank Canada v. Guido, 2025 ONSC 869, HSBC Bank Canada v. Guido, 2024 ONSC 5750
facts:
HSBC Bank Canada loaned money to Royal Canadian Bedrock Inc. (“RCB”), and RCB defaulted. The appellant AG, who was RCB’s principal, understood and signed the bank documents, which included his personal loan guarantee.
When RCB defaulted on the loan, HSBC sought to enforce the guarantee against AG. In response, AG did not dispute that he had signed the guarantee but argued that HSBC was bound by a side agreement allegedly arranged by BC of MT & Associates Inc. (“MTA”). BC and MTA had been retained as agents of RCB and AG to assist in securing credit facilities, but AG claimed that they also acted as agents of HSBC. He alleged that in this capacity BC misrepresented that HSBC would not enforce the guarantee and further conspired with HSBC executives to extract unlawful fees from him in exchange for promises of leniency and forbearance.
The motion judge found there was no evidence to support these allegations. There was nothing to show that BC had authority to act on HSBC’s behalf, or that the bank permitted him to do so, and the loan documents contained non-reliance and non-waiver clauses that precluded reliance on any representations external to the agreement. With respect to the conspiracy allegations, the motion judge noted that although BC admitted to paying fees to AD, there was no evidence linking AD to HSBC. The only connection was that AD was a friend of HSBC’s account manager and had once delivered loan documents at a soccer game, which the judge found insufficient to suggest involvement in a scheme. After five years of litigation, including discovery, cross-examinations, and the examination of BC, AG had not produced any evidence corroborating his claims.
AG also argued that the motion judge should have adjourned the summary judgment motion to permit additional refusals to be answered, to compel further production, and to add AD as a defendant, but the judge concluded these requests were part of a pattern of delay and that there was no reasonable prospect that further steps would yield relevant evidence. His request to stay enforcement of the judgment was likewise denied, as any damages claim AG might pursue against BC, MTA, or AD would not offset the debt owed to HSBC. The motion judge ultimately granted summary judgment in favour of HSBC and dismissed AG’s counterclaim.
issues:
1. Did the motion judge err in finding that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on AG’s allegations of agency, misrepresentation, and conspiracy? 2. Did the motion judge err in refusing AG’s request for an adjournment to pursue refusals, obtain further production, and add an additional defendant? 3. Did the motion judge err in refusing to stay enforcement of summary judgment under r. 20.08 of the Rules? 4. Should leave to appeal the substantial indemnity costs award be granted?
holding:
Appeal dismissed.
reasoning:
1. No. The Court found no error in the granting of summary judgment. There was no evidence that BC had actual or ostensible authority from HSBC, or that HSBC held him out as its agent. The motion judge properly declined to draw an adverse inference from HSBC’s refusals to conduct further searches. AG offered no basis to suggest the original search/production was deficient. Even if agency were arguable, the non-reliance and non-waiver provisions in the loan documents barred reliance on alleged external representations, reinforcing that no trial was required. The conspiracy argument rested on speculation and lacked evidentiary foundation after years of discovery. There was no factual basis to overturn the motion judge’s findings on the “palpable and overriding error” argument.
2. No. There was no error in refusing the adjournment. This was AG’s third request since he learned of AD’s identity and the motion judge reasonably characterized the pattern as delay. Disclosure of AD’s identity did not generate a need for more production or discovery and did not support the notion that AD acted for HSBC. Proceeding without further delay was appropriate.
3. No. The Court upheld the refusal to stay enforcement. There was no demonstrated risk of duplicative or inconsistent proceedings because enforcing the guarantee did not require fact-finding about BC or AD. Any damages that AG might later prove against other parties would not create a set-off against what he owed HSBC under the guarantee.
4. No. The court did not find that this situation met the requirement for leave to appeal a costs order. Leave is only granted in “obvious cases” with strong grounds. Substantial indemnity costs were justified by AG’s procedural delay, unfounded allegations that complicated an otherwise straightforward enforcement action, and the guarantee’s costs clause.
Robson v. Pellerin, 2025 ONCA 680
[Thorburn, Copeland and Gomery JJ.A.]
Counsel:
S. Duguay, for the appellant
M.C.B. Pellerin, acting in person
Keywords: Family Law, Property Division, Gifts, Loans, Net Family Property, Exclusions, Inheritances, Matrimonial Home, Post-Separation Adjustments, Spousal Support, Duration, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, ss. 4(1), 4(2), 5(6), Poole v. Poole (2001), 16 R.F.L. (5th) 397, Cade v. Rotstein (2004), 50 R.F.L. (5th) 280 (Ont. C.A.), Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 105, Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, Green v. Green, 2015 ONCA 541
facts:
This appeal arose from a contested trial involving issues such as parenting, child and spousal support, the validity of a separation agreement, a claim for vesting title to the matrimonial home and cottage, equalization, post-separation adjustments and the sale of the properties. The appellant appealed aspects of the trial judge’s order concerning the equalization calculation as a result of a loan owed to his deceased mother, post-separation adjustments to the equalization payment, and the term of his spousal support payments.
issues:
1. Did the trial judge err in calculating the appellant’s net family property by assigning no value on the valuation date to the debt he claimed was owed to his mother? 2. If the trial judge did not err in finding that the mother’s estate had forgiven the loans and, as a result, valuing them at zero as of the valuation date, did the trial judge err in treating the loans differently on the date of marriage and the date of separation? 3. Did the trial judge err in giving the appellant no credit as a post-separation adjustment for $155,945.08 received as an inheritance from his mother’s estate and deposited into the parties’ joint account after the date of separation? 4. Did the trial judge err in failing to give the appellant credit for post-separation payments for expenses he paid related to carrying costs, maintenance, and claimed improvements to the matrimonial home and cottage? 5. Did the trial judge err in failing to account for the period of post-separation cohabitation of close to two years in calculating the ten years of periodic spousal support payable to the respondent?
holding:
Appeal allowed in part.
reasoning:
1. No. The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in calculating his net family property by assigning no value on the valuation date to the debt owed to his mother totalling $508,000, comprised of $53,000 advanced before marriage and $455,000 advanced after marriage and before separation. The trial judge found that the $455,000 was traceable into the matrimonial home and cottage. After weighing the evidence, the trial judge concluded that the funds were loans at the time they were advanced but were forgiven upon the mother’s death prior to the valuation date, resulting in no debt owed as of the valuation date. The trial judge included the $53,000 as a debt on the date of marriage with the appellant accepting the legal framework applied but argued that the trial judge erred in not accepting his submission of “notional” repayment to the estate. The trial judge rejected this argument, finding no evidence of payment after the mother’s death, no demand for payment from the estate, and no listing of the debt in the estate’s assets, and concluded there was no reasonable probability the estate would make a demand on the loan. The Court believed the trial judge’s finding that the loans were forgiven was consistent with the evidence, and no palpable and overriding error was found.
2. No. The appellant argued that including the $53,000 loaned before marriage as a debt at the date of marriage was inconsistent with the finding that all loans from his mother were forgiven by the estate at her death. The process for calculating net family property for equalization was strictly defined by the Family Law Act (“FLA”), which required property to be calculated as of the valuation date and as of the date of marriage. The trial judge found that the loans were forgiven at the time of the mother’s death, which preceded the valuation date, so there was no debt owing on the valuation date, but the $53,000 loan was properly characterized as a debt at the date of marriage. The Court stated the specificity of the FLA’s definition was intended to promote certainty, predictability, and finality, and the threshold for departure from strict application was exceptionally high, requiring unconscionability rather than unfairness. The Court held that the trial judge did not err in including the $53,000 owed at the date of marriage in the calculation.
3. Yes. The appellant argued the trial judge erred in giving no credit as a post-separation adjustment for $155,945.08 received as an inheritance and deposited into the parties’ joint account after separation, which was used for the benefit of the family. He contended that, absent evidence of his intention to gift these monies to the respondent, he should have been given credit for his sole contribution to these joint expenses, as with the inherited funds applied to the parties’ line of credit. The trial judge found the inheritance vested in the appellant at his mother’s death but was excluded property and credited him for half of the $159,220 used to pay off the joint line of credit. The trial judge rejected however, the appellant’s argument for credit for half of the $155,945.08 deposited into the joint account, except for $46,500 invested in the respondent’s TFSA and $13,394 for a vehicle purchased for the respondent. The trial judge found evidence of a benefit accrued solely to the respondent for these two expenses. It was concluded that the appellant was entitled to credit for half of the remaining $96,051.08, resulting in a further post-separation credit of $48,025.54 in addition to the $59,894 already credited.
4. No. At trial, the appellant made a claim based on proprietary estoppel that the title to the matrimonial home and cottage should vest in him as of the date of separation, which the trial judge rejected. Since the appellant did not frame the issue at trial as a request for a post-separation adjustment, the Court found it difficult to fault the trial judge for not giving credit for these expenses. The Court stated that the trial judge’s findings in relation to the proprietary estoppel claim undermined the appellant’s argument, as the appellant occupied both properties exclusively without paying occupation rent and received a corresponding benefit. The trial judge found that the expenses incurred related to his personal use and enjoyment and did not support an equitable claim. The Court held that these findings foreclosed the appellant’s claim for a post-separation adjustment, and there was no basis to interfere.
5. No. The appellant contended that the ten years of spousal support should have commenced at the date of separation rather than starting after the respondent moved out of the matrimonial home. The trial judge found that the respondent was entitled to ongoing periodic spousal support on a compensatory basis, payable for ten years based on the respondent moving out of the matrimonial home and found that the parties continued to be financially intertwined during the two years they lived together after separation. The appellant did not challenge the entitlement or quantum of support, only the commencement date, arguing that he received no credit for the almost two years of continued cohabitation. The Court believed the trial judge’s decision in relation to spousal support was entitled to significant deference, and there was no basis to interfere. The Court stated the trial judge was aware that the parties continued to live together for almost two years after separation, and there was no palpable and overriding error in her conclusions on spousal support.
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