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Court of Appeal Summaries (September 15 – September 19)

September 23, 2025 | John Polyzogopoulos

Table of Contents

 

Civil Decisions

 

Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 641

 

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Licensing, Discipline, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Cross-appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Procedural and Natural Justice, Right to be Heard, LSO By-Law 4, s.14(2), s. 18(2), Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 257, Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 464, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Mirza et al. v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6727

 

Martin v. 110037315 Canada Inc., 2025 ONCA 658

 

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Power of Sale, Bona Fide Purchaser for Value Without Notice, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Settlements, Orders, Administration of Justice, Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.L.5, Martin v. 11037315 Canada Inc., 2022 ONCA 322, Uhrik v. Terrigno, 2024 ABCA 383, C.S. v. D.S., 2022 NBCA 51, Garshowitz v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 251, Kubota v. Kubota, 2022 BCCA 41, Malick v. McCullough, 2023 BCCA 190

 

Short Civil Decisions

 

Lavallée v. Desormeaux, 2025 ONCA 646

 

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Family Law, Real Property, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, Re Burke, [1960] O.R. 26 (C.A.), Ross v. Canada Trust Company, 2021 ONCA 161, Murphy v. McSorley, [1929] S.C.R 542

 

Ontario (Attorney General) v. Cycle Toronto, 2025 ONCA 659

 

Keywords: Constitutional Law, Charter Rights, Public Law, Transportation, Highways, Municipal Law, Roads, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Case Management, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 and 7, Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 195.6

 

Pedaya v. 261109 Ontario Inc., 2025 ONCA 657

 

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgement, Costs

 CIVIL DECISIONS

 

Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 641

 

[Sossin J.A. (Motion Judge)]

 

Counsel:

 

J. Haylock, for the moving party S.S.

 

T. Gleason, for the responding party Law Society of Ontario

 

Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Licensing, Discipline, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Cross-appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Procedural and Natural Justice, Right to be Heard, LSO By-Law 4, s.14(2), s. 18(2), Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 257, Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 464, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Mirza et al. v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6727

 

Facts:

 

This motion arose during litigation in the wake of the November 2021 Ontario bar exam cheating scandal. Upon detection of a security breach and leaked exam materials, the Law Society of Ontario (the “LSO”) told numerous licensing candidates that their exam results and registrations in the lawyer licensing process were deemed void. These candidates would have to start the entire process again, repeating the exams and their experiential training. SS, the moving party, had her barrister exam result voided, but unlike the others, her registration was not deemed void.

 

The licensing candidates sued the LSO in Divisional Court. The Divisional Court upheld the fairness of the LSO’s decision to void the exam results but found the voiding of licensing registrations procedurally unfair. The Court of Appeal granted the LSO’s appeal of this judgment, holding that candidates were owed limited procedural protections since the LSO’s decision was administrative in nature. The Court denied a motion to reconsider.

 

In this context, SS brought a motion for an extension of time to perfect a cross-appeal from the Divisional Court’s initial decision. SS wished to argue in her proposed cross-appeal that the LSO’s decision to void her exam result was procedurally unfair since the LSO (allegedly) improperly failed to disclose an expert statistical report relied on in voiding her exam, depriving her of the chance to call expert reply evidence. This disclosure issue had not yet been canvassed by either court. SS explained her delay in cross-appealing by asserting that she received poor legal advice that it would be inappropriate to cross-appeal while the LSO’s appeal was ongoing. She also suggested that she wanted to wait for the results of the LSO’s appeal and the reconsideration motion before seeking an extension to cross-appeal. SS claimed to be experiencing significant health problems that further delayed her cross-appeal and prevented her from rewriting the barrister exam.

 

The LSO opposed SS’s motion on the basis that it represented a further attempt to reopen issues firmly decided by both the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal. The LSO argued that in light of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the LSO’s decision to void many candidates’ entire licensing process was procedurally fair, the Court would not likely reach a different conclusion in the context of voiding exams – a less serious decision, to which a similar fairness analysis would apply.

 

Issues:

 

Should SS be granted an extension of time to perfect her cross-appeal against the Divisional Court’s decision?

 

Holding:

 

Motion dismissed.

 

Reasoning:

 

No. The Court held that SS’s proposed cross-appeal lacked merit, with the justice of the case weighing against granting her an extension of time. The Court applied the undisputed “justice of the case” test for motions to extend time from Enbridge Gas, which requires consideration of the following main factors;

 

a)    whether the moving party formed the bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time period;

 

b)    the length of, and any explanation for, the delay in filing;

 

c)    any prejudice to the responding party caused or exacerbated by the delay; and

 

d)    the merits of the proposed appeal (here, cross-appeal).

 

The Court accepted that SS may not have been aware of the availability of a cross-appeal at the time that the LSO appealed the Divisional Court’s decision. However, the Court was unimpressed by SS’s suggestion that she wanted to wait for the results of the appeal and reconsideration motion before bringing her own appeal. This argument created the unfavourable impression that SS hoped to relitigate the fairness of the LSO’s actions against the licensing candidates and was therefore trying to achieve indirectly what the Court had already denied directly.

 

Acknowledging SS’s poor health, the Court stated that the first three Enbridge factors were an insufficient basis upon which to dismiss the motion, since permitting the cross-appeal would not cause the LSO any real prejudice. Nevertheless, the Court ultimately denied SS the extension, holding that her proposed cross-appeal failed the merits aspect of the test and did not give rise to an arguable case. The Court agreed with the LSO that it was not plausible that it would reach a different conclusion regarding the procedural fairness of voiding the exams compared to voiding the licensing registrations, since the consequences of the former decision were less severe, and both decisions were made under substantially the same regulatory regime. Allowing SS’s cross-appeal at this late stage would give rise to a piecemeal approach to challenging the fairness of the LSO’s actions, which had already been thoroughly litigated.

 

Martin v. 11037315 Canada Inc., 2025 ONCA 648

 

[Sossin, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A.]

 

COUNSEL:

 

S. Chhina, for the moving party

 

D. Van Sickle, for the responding party

 

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Enforcement, Power of Sale, Bona Fide Purchaser for Value Without Notice, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Settlements, Orders, Administration of Justice, Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.L.5, Martin v. 11037315 Canada Inc., 2022 ONCA 322, Uhrik v. Terrigno, 2024 ABCA 383, C.S. v. D.S., 2022 NBCA 51, Garshowitz v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 251, Kubota v. Kubota, 2022 BCCA 41, Malick v. McCullough, 2023 BCCA 190

 

FACTS:

 

This case had a complicated history, including a previous appeal heard by the Court. M owned a residential property, which was subject to a second mortgage held by 2148468 Ontario Ltd. (“214”). In June 2019, M defaulted on her mortgage payments due to fraudulent activity on her bank account. 214 assigned its mortgage to 11037315 Canada Inc. (“110”).

 

110 then commenced foreclosure proceedings and obtained a default judgment against M. 110 sold the property to 267, the moving party in these proceedings. M became aware of the default judgment and sale of her property after these had occurred while she still resided at the property. M then brought a motion to the Superior Court and obtained an order setting aside the default judgment and directing the sale of the property. The Court allowed an appeal from that decision and directed that there was to be a trial of the issue of whether 267 was a bona fide purchaser of the property for value without notice. The purpose of deciding this issue was to determine whether 267 could benefit from the protection of the Land Titles Act. In its decision, the Court made several other directions, including for a reference to determine how much money was owed to M.

 

The trial judge found that the responding party was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. In her reasons, the trial judge made significant negative credibility findings regarding the witnesses called on behalf of 110 and 267. In her decision, she noted that the property had been sold by 267’s creditors and that she was therefore not able to order that the property be sold under M’s notice of sale. She also stated that she had been advised by the parties that $140,000 was being held in trust and that, if she set aside the sale between 110 and 267, it was not necessary for her to make any other orders for relief. The judge ultimately made the following order:

 

“1.            THIS COURT DECLARES with respect to the purchase of the property located at 1560 Reeves Gates, Unit 22, Oakville, Ontario, the respondent, 2670082 Ontario Corp., is not a bona fide purchaser without actual notice.

 

2.            THIS COURT ORDERS that costs of this action shall be determined after further submissions from the parties.”

 

267 then brought a motion to the Court to allow the appeal on consent. The only evidence in support of the motion was an affidavit sworn by a law clerk which attached the trial judge’s reasons for decision, 267’s notice of appeal and the consent of M to the proposed draft order. There was no explanation for why the order was being sought. The order originally sought by the parties was as follows:

 

“1.            THIS COURT ORDERS that the judgment of Justice Chozik, dated July 12, 2024, be set aside only with respect to the finding that the appellant, 2670082 Ontario Corp. was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, along with all related relief granted against the appellant, 2670082 Ontario Corp., that arise from the judgment of Justice Chozik, dated July 12, 2024.

 

2.            THIS COURT ORDERS that the application below, bearing Court File No.: CV-20-00000650-000 be dismissed against the appellant, 2670082 Ontario Corp.”

 

At the hearing of the motion, counsel explained that the parties had reached a settlement under which M was to receive payment of some moneys held in trust following the sale of her home, but that part of the agreement also required her to consent to an order setting aside the trial judge’s finding that the transfer of the property from 110 to 267 was not a bona fide purchase without notice. In his submissions, counsel for 267 candidly stated that his client’s principals were concerned about the findings made against them and the impact on their reputations.

 

The Court advised that it was not satisfied that it could allow the appeal on consent as there did not appear to be any legal or factual basis for doing so. The parties were directed to make written submissions in support of the relief they sought:

 

“ON CONSENT of the parties, filed, and on noting that no party to this proceeding is under any legal disability, and without expressing agreement or disagreement with the decision of the judge below:

 

1.                  THIS COURT ORDERS that the judgment of Justice Chozik, dated July 12, 2024, in Court File No.: CV-20-00000650-000 be set aside.”

 

ISSUE:

 

Should the Court allow the appeal on consent or to “set aside” the trial judge’s judgment as requested by the parties?

 

HOLDING:

 

Motion dismissed.

 

REASONING:

 

No. The Court found that it cannot allow an appeal or set aside a judgment or order made below based on the parties’ consent alone. The Court’s function is to consider, in every case, whether the relief requested is appropriate considering the law and the facts.

 

The Court found that Court of Appeal for British Columbia decisions referenced in the parties’ arguments did not assist them. These BCCA decisions make clear that an appeal will not be allowed on consent if doing so would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. This case highlighted the mischief that can occur if the Court were simply to rubber stamp an agreement between parties to allow an appeal on consent.

 

The Court said that it would not whitewash the trial judge’s finding of misconduct. In the absence of any legal or evidentiary error, there was no authority for the Court to set aside her judgment.

 

 

 

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

 

Lavallée c. Desormeaux, 2025 ONCA 646

 

[Thorburn, Copeland and Gomery JJ.A.]

 

Counsel:

 

P. Champagne, for the appellant

 

P. Ranger, C. Daoust and P. Pilon, for the respondent

 

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Family Law, Real Property, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, Re Burke, [1960] O.R. 26 (C.A.), Ross v. Canada Trust Company, 2021 ONCA 161, Murphy v. McSorley, [1929] S.C.R 542

 

Ontario (Attorney General) v. Cycle Toronto, 2025 ONCA 659

 

[Zarnett J.A.]

 

Counsel:

 

P. Champagne, for the appellant

 

P. Ranger, C. Daoust and P. Pilon, for the respondent

 

J Hunter, C Zwibel and E Guilbault, for the appellants

 

A Lewis, G Hoaken, C Dunne, and B Roe, for the respondents

 

N de Stefano, for the proposed intervener, Canadian Public Health Association

 

A Chen, for the proposed intervener, Greenpeace Canada

 

V Zbogar, for the proposed intervener, For Our Kids – Toronto

 

Keywords: Constitutional Law, Charter Rights, Public Law, Transportation, Highways, Municipal Law, Roads, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Case Management, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 and 7, Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 195.6

 

Pedaya v. 261109 Ontario Inc., 2025 ONCA 657

 

[Thorburn, Coroza and Gomery JJ.A.]

 

Counsel:

 

F.M. S. B. Hossain, for the appellant

 

D. Dolson, for the respondent

 

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgement, Costs

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