In Aukema v. Peters, the Court was asked to hear a special case at first instance, bypassing the Superior Court, to answer the legal question of whether reports to law enforcement alleging criminal activity are protected by absolute privilege or qualified privilege. The Court found that the elements required under r. 22.03 were not met, and that the matter should proceed to trial in the Superior Court in the normal course.
In Sharif v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), the Court upheld the application judge’s decision not to set aside Canada’s decision not to delay the removal of an asylum seeker pending the consideration of the case by the UN’s Human Rights Council. Nevertheless, the removal order was stayed for 60 days.
In Trebell v. Canada Life Assurance Company, the Court allowed Canada Life’s appeal from a summary judgment awarding life insurance benefits to the policy beneficiary. The Court held that the two-year contestability limitation in s. 184(2) of the Insurance Act cannot be imported into s. 180(1)(c). Further, the Court held that s. 180(1)(c) operates as a condition precedent to contract formation, and where a change in insurability occurs between application and policy delivery, the insurer may deny coverage regardless of the passage of time. Finally, the Court further held that the policy’s incontestability clause did not oust the statute’s application.
In Paterson v. Royal Bank of Canada, the appellant argued that the judge erred by striking out his claim for having been brought outside of the 15-year ultimate limitation period.
In UM Financial Inc. v. Central 1 Credit Union, the Court dismissed an appeal challenging a vexatious litigant order under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act and a personal costs award against a corporate director.
Table of Contents
Civil Decisions
Aukema v. Peters, 2026 ONCA 484
Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Defences, Absolute Privilege, Qualified Privilege, Civil Procedure, Special Case, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 22.03, Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 ONCA 181, Cusson v. Quan, 2007 ONCA 771, Marcellin v. London (Police Services Board),2024 ONCA 468, Seed v. Delhey (1989), 67 O.R. (2d) 317 (C.A.), Bank of Montreal v. Bray, (1998) 36 O.R. (3d) 99 (C.A.)
Sharif v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 ONCA 476
Keywords: Administrative Law, Citizenship and Immigration, Refugees, Crown Prerogative, Judicial Review, Jurisdiction, Justiciability, Statutory Interpretation, Customary International Law, Non-Refoulement, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Can. T.S. 1969 No. 6, s. 33, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 46(1)(c), 48(2), 50(e), 72(2)(e) 115, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, T.S. 1976 No. 47, s. 4(2), Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/3/Rev.12, r. 94, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, [1976] Can T.S. no. 47, ss. 2(3), 6(1), 7, Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1, s. 6(2), Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-7, ss. 2(1), 18(1), Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36, s. 3, Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 17, Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, r. 94, Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, Sharif v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1152, Black v. Canada (Prime Minister) (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 215 (C.A.), Ahani v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 107 (C.A.), Toussaint v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 ONCA 117, Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21, Nevsun Resources Ltd v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 17, Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, Ross River Dena Council Band v. Canada, 2002 SCC 54, Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626, Hupacasath First Nations v. Canada (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada), 2015 FCA 4, Atawnah v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FCA 144, leave to appeal dismissed [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 313, Revell v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 262, leave to appeal dismissed [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 478, Tapambwa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 34, leave to appeal dismissed [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 105, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Canada Post Corp. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2019 SCC 67, Mahjoub v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 144, leave to appeal dismissed [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 379, Portnov v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 171, MacKenzie v. Ottawa Community Housing Corporation, 2023 ONCA 43, Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v. The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, 2012 FCA 22, Re Keeprite Workers’ Independent Union et al. and Keeprite Products Ltd. (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.), Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62
Trebell v. Canada Life Assurance Company, 2026 ONCA 481
Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Life Insurance, Conditions Precedent, Change in Insurability, Statutory Interpretation, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Insurance Act R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, Life Insurance Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. L-14, An Act to amend The Insurance Act, S.O. 1961-62, c. 63, Ontario Securities Commission v. Tiffin, 2020 ONCA 217, Ledcor Construction Ltd. v. Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co., 2016 SCC 37, Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2025 SCC 15, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd. v. Canadian Air Line Pilots Assn., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 724, Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37, Hunt v. Canada, 2026 FCA 88, R. v. Rafilovich, 2019 SCC 51, R. v. Basque, 2023 SCC 18, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, R. v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, Wagner Brothers Holdings Inc. v. Laurier Life Insurance Co. (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 609 (C.A.), Ryan v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (1999), 179 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 306 (N.L. C.A.), Beattie v. National Frontier Insurance Co. (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 60 (C.A.), Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), 2006 SCC 20, R. v. Shearing, 2002 SCC 58, Kosicki v. Toronto (City), 2025 SCC 28, Saskatchewan River Bungalows v. Maritime Life Assurance Co., [1994] 2 S.C.R. 490, The Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York v. Mowat (1902), 32 S.C.R. 147, Donovan v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. (1916), 53 S.C.R. 539, Patterson v. Gallant, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1080, Nuraney v. MBA Insurance Brokers Inc. (1989), 38 C.C.L.I. 243 (Ont. H.C.J.), Beldent c. Sun Life du Canada, compagnie d’assurance-vie, 1997 CanLII 10112 (Q.C. C.A.), General Trust of Canada v. Artisans Coopvie, Société Coopérative d’Assurance-vie, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1185, Van Huizen v. Trisura Guarantee Insurance Company, 2020 ONCA 222, McCunn Estate v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 304 (C.A.), Miller Paving Limited v. B. Gottardo Construction Ltd., 2007 ONCA 422, Lee v. 1435375 Ontario Ltd., 2013 ONCA 516, Ramey v. Maritime Life Assurance Co. (1972), 2 O.R. 169 (H.C.J.), R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, Pagliaroli v. Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc., 2012 ONSC 6862, Anderson Estate v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 2005 SKCA 130, Emond v. Trillium Mutual Insurance Co., 2026 SCC 3, Sabean v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Co., 2017 SCC 7, MacDonald v. Chicago Title Insurance Co. of Canada, 2015 ONCA 842, Ashak v. Ontario (Family Responsibility Office), 2013 ONCA 375, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Markham: Butterworths, 2002), General Principles of Canadian Insurance Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2026) (online), Detailed Report of the Superintendent of Insurance and Registrar of Friendly Societies (Toronto: Clarkson W. James, 1924), he Uniform Life Insurance Act of Canada, 2nd ed. (The Life Underwriters Association of Canada, 1937), Superintendent’s 1924 Report, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 9th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), The Construction of Statutes, 7th ed., Norwood on Life Insurance Law in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2002)
Paterson v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2026 ONCA 480
Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Conspiracy to Injure, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Ultimate Limitation Period, Wilful Concealment, Striking Pleadings, Abuse of Process, Collateral Attack, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, s. 15, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21, Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79 (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 541, York Condominium Corporation No. 382 v. Jay-M Holdings Limited, 2007 ONCA 49, Kaynes v. BP plc, 2021 ONCA 36, 456 D.L.R. (4th) 247, Das v. George Weston Limited, 2018 ONCA 1053, Zeppav. Woodbridge Heating & Air-Conditioning Ltd., 2019 ONCA 47, M(K) v. M(H), [1992] 3 SCR 6, King v. Victor Parsons & Co., [1973] 1 All E.R. 206 (C.A.), Taylor v. David, 2021 ONSC 3264, Bongard v. Bullen, 2025 ONCA 473, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, Johnson v. Studley, 2014 ONSC 1732, Bhoola v. Vaughan (City), 2024 ONSC 103, Johnston v. Griffiths, 2025 ONSC 2048
UM Financial Inc. v. Central 1 Credit Union, 2026 ONCA 475
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigation, Frivolous, Vexatious, Abuse of Process, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 140, College of Registered Nurses of Manitoba v. Hancock, 2023 MBCA 70, Barry v. Anantharajah, 2025 ONCA 603, Brad-Jay Investments Ltd. v. Szijjarto (2006), 218 O.A.C. 315 (C.A.), Lenczner Slaght LLP v. GlycoBioSciences Inc., 2025 ONCA 841, Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, Leitch v. Novac, 2020 ONCA 257, McLean v. Connell, 2025 ONCA 495, Lochner v. Ontario Civilian Police Commission, 2020 ONCA 720, Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 4, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chavali (1998), 31 C.P.C. (4th) 221 (Ont. C.A.), Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 59, Re Lang Michener and Fabian (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 353 (H.C.), Jonsson v. Lymer, 2020 ABCA 167, Schwilgin v. Szivy, 2015 ONCA 816, 1318847 Ontario Limited v. Laval Tool & Mould Ltd., 2017 ONCA 184, Saccon (Litigation Guardian of) v. Sisson (1992), 9 C.P.C. (3d) 383 (Ont. Gen. Div.)
Short Civil Decisions
Avida 2015 Inc (Re), 2026 ONCA 478
Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Property of the Bankrupt, Choses in Action, Liquidation, Credit Bids, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Interveners, Avida 2015 Inc. (Re), 2026 ONCA 426
Natario v. RBC Insurance Company of Canada, 2026 ONCA 482
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Occupier’s Liability, Contracts, Insurance, Defences, Fraud, Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 132(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 26.01
McClory v. Laird, 2026 ONCA 483
Keywords: Wills and Estates, Estate Administration, Passing of Accounts, Civil Procedure, Applications, Abandonment, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.14(3)
Cusnir v. Taylor, 2026 ONCA 470
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agency, Insurance, Torts, Professional Negligence, Real Estate Brokers, Civil Procedure, Abuse of Process, Costs, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 132, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 30, Sched. C, ss. 4 & 9, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 25.06(1), Girao v Cunningham, 2021 ONCA 18, Benarroch v Fred Tayar & Associates P.C., 2019 ONCA 228, Fong v Chan (1999), 46 OR (3d) 330 (CA)
SPM Charters Inc. v. Flightpath Charter Airways Inc., 2026 ONCA 471
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 13 & 19, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20 & 20.05, Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Tomec v Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 839
Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Peel v. A.W., 2026 ONCA 477
Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Child Protection, Best Interests of the Child, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Child, Youth, and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, s. 74(2)(h), Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12
Never Forgotten National Memorial Foundation v. Canada (Parks)., 2026 ONCA 489
Keywords: Breach of Contract, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Summary Judgment, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, ss. 2, 4 & 16(1)(a)
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Settlements
CIVIL DECISIONS
Aukema v. Peters, 2026 ONCA 484
[Thorburn J.A.]
Counsel:
D. Grigoras, for the plaintiff
G. Latner, for the defendants
Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Defences, Absolute Privilege, Qualified Privilege, Civil Procedure, Special Case, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 22.03, Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 ONCA 181, Cusson v. Quan, 2007 ONCA 771, Marcellin v. London (Police Services Board),2024 ONCA 468, Seed v. Delhey (1989), 67 O.R. (2d) 317 (C.A.), Bank of Montreal v. Bray, (1998) 36 O.R. (3d) 99 (C.A.)
Facts:
This motion is related to an ongoing defamation action before the Superior Court of Justice. The plaintiff claims that the defendants made false statements to the police accusing him of serious criminal conduct. The parties submit that whether absolute privilege protects initial reports made by victims or witnesses to police, as opposed to subsequent statements given under oath, is an important question of law that the Court has yet to explicitly address. The parties argued that the caselaw in Ontario is not clear about whether qualified or absolute privilege attaches to an initial police statement not made under oath. The parties argued that r. 22.03(1)(c) is engaged because of the defendant’s contention that the existing appellate authorities, to the extent that they suggest qualified privilege over absolute privilege, should not be followed.
Issues:
1. Are the prerequisites of r. 22.03 met allowing the Court of Appeal to hear a special case?
2. If yes, are reports to law enforcement alleging criminal activity protected by absolute privilege?
Holding:
Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
1. No. The defendants’ submission that the Court should clarify the existing case law did not satisfy any of the prerequisite elements listed in r. 22.03. Moreover, the position was incompatible with r. 22.03(1)(c), which does not apply where the caselaw challenged by the parties does not “conclusively and indistinguishably” determine the legal issue: Seed v. Delhey. The parties did not identify any conflict in the jurisprudence of the Superior Court or between appellate courts in Canada on this issue as required. Accordingly, none of the prerequisites in r. 22.03 for the Court to hear a special case at first instance had been met. The Court found that even if the prerequisites of the rule had been established, it was not satisfied that determination of this question would shorten the hearing or result in a substantial cost saving. The Court acknowledged that while the issue of whether absolute or qualified privilege applies to initial complaints to police is an important legal issue, it was not persuaded that this action warranted resorting to the Court determining the legal issue in the first instance.
2. Not decided. The action must be dismissed if reports to the police are protected by absolute privilege, but the same is not true if these reports are protected by qualified privilege. A trial must therefore be held to determine if the report was in fact made with malice.
Sharif v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 ONCA 476
[Thorburn, Pomerance, Rahman]
Counsel:
G. van Ert, D. Shuhaibar and J. Chandrashekar, for the appellant
B. Assan and N. Shahbaz, for the respondent
M. Silcoff and E. Simpson, for the intervener, the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers
Keywords: Administrative Law, Citizenship and Immigration, Refugees, Crown Prerogative, Judicial Review, Jurisdiction, Justiciability, Statutory Interpretation, Customary International Law, Non-Refoulement, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Can. T.S. 1969 No. 6, s. 33, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 46(1)(c), 48(2), 50(e), 72(2)(e) 115, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, T.S. 1976 No. 47, s. 4(2), Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/3/Rev.12, r. 94, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, [1976] Can T.S. no. 47, ss. 2(3), 6(1), 7, Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1, s. 6(2), Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-7, ss. 2(1), 18(1), Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36, s. 3, Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 17, Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, r. 94, Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, Sharif v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1152, Black v. Canada (Prime Minister) (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 215 (C.A.), Ahani v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 107 (C.A.), Toussaint v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 ONCA 117, Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21, Nevsun Resources Ltd v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 17, Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, Ross River Dena Council Band v. Canada, 2002 SCC 54, Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626, Hupacasath First Nations v. Canada (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada), 2015 FCA 4, Atawnah v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FCA 144, leave to appeal dismissed [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 313, Revell v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 262, leave to appeal dismissed [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 478, Tapambwa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 34, leave to appeal dismissed [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 105, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Canada Post Corp. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2019 SCC 67, Mahjoub v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 144, leave to appeal dismissed [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 379, Portnov v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 171, MacKenzie v. Ottawa Community Housing Corporation, 2023 ONCA 43, Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v. The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, 2012 FCA 22, Re Keeprite Workers’ Independent Union et al. and Keeprite Products Ltd. (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.), Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62
Facts:
The appellant, MS, was a refugee from Somalia. In 2013, MS was granted refugee status by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees pursuant to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. MS was subsequently granted permanent resident status in 2019, along with other members of MS’ family. MS has limited English proficiency and did not speak Somali (his native tongue was Arabic). Moreover, MS faced significant mental health challenges, and was formally diagnosed with schizophrenia, with clear psychotic symptoms requiring lifelong treatment on July 31, 2025. This ultimately led to his three involuntary hospitalizations for extended periods. MS committed sexual assault while involuntarily hospitalized in June 2022. In August 2022, MS pleaded guilty to sexual assault, trafficking fentanyl, mischief, theft and resisting arrest. Due to the conviction, the Immigration and Refugee Board found MS inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality on October 4, 2023, pursuant to section 46(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA“). However, since MS was a refugee, he could not be immediately removed from Canada.
On May 13, 2024, the Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) notified MS of its intention to seek a Danger Opinion from the Minister of Immigration under section 115(2) of the IRPA. In August 2024, MS was able to make submissions regarding his strides in rehabilitation, his strong support system in Canada, the risks he faces upon his return to Somalia, and various humanitarian considerations for his non-removal. On January 8, 2025, while being held at a psychiatric centre, MS received a letter from the CBSA with a final notice attached with the Danger Opinion and various materials to provide further submissions and evidence. MS was later given a three-month extension to respond in March 2025. Nevertheless, MS was unable to respond because he was no longer represented by his previous counsel and unable to obtain legal aid, he did not understand English well enough and was involuntarily hospitalized. On May 7, 2025, a report was addressed to the CBSA that contained an assessment of MS’ mental health condition. The report concluded that MS struggled with substance use, schizophrenia (query substance induced) and depression.
The finalized Danger Opinion contained a police record made after the sexual assault, wherein the author stated that the doctor overseeing the patients on the psychiatric wing was concerned for MS, suggesting that he be sent to a forensic psychiatric institution. Regarding MS’ mental health, the Danger Opinion only contained a statement that acknowledged he suffered from mental health issues that required medical attention and hospitalization. The Danger Opinion also found that there were no substantial grounds to believe that MS would face torture, the death penalty, a risk to his life or cruel or unusual treatment or punishment if he returned to Somalia. Accordingly, the Danger Opinion concluded that MS’ removal was in accordance with section 7 of the Charter and that it fits within the exception of section 115(2)(a) of the IRPA. The Danger Opinion failed to address several critical issues, including the severity of MS’ mental health condition, Somalia’s likely refusal to accept his return or issue travel documents, CBSA’s deviation from its own policy to accompany him to Somalia, and evidence of a terrorist group’s growing presence in Somalia. It also did not account for the fact that MS’ failure to respond to the January 2025 notice was due to his involuntary detention in a mental health facility, lack of legal counsel and limited English proficiency.
MS had previously filed an application for leave to appeal and judicial review of the Danger Opinion in the Federal Court. MS’ applications were dismissed. MS also brought a motion to stay his deportation pending the application for leave to appeal, which was also dismissed.
MS retained new counsel who highlighted the impacts of MS’ mental health during a detention review hearing. However, the CBSA proceeded to schedule MS’ removal from Canada for June 30, 2025. On June 27, 2025, MS’ removal from Canada had been postponed until July 11, 2025. On July 2, MS filed a complaint with the UNHRC to request that Canada suspend the removal until the complaint was considered through an Interim Measures Request (“IMR”). The UNHRC asked Canada to hold MS’ removal in abeyance while MS’ request was under consideration. However, the Minister refused the UNHRC’s request.
MS brought an urgent application before the Superior Court for judicial review of the Minister’s decision. The application was dismissed on the basis that the Minister had no duty to provide reasons and was, in any event, reasonable. MS appealed.
Issues:
1. Did the application judge err in concluding that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to review Canada’s decision?
2. Did the application judge err in determining that Canada’s decision was justiciable?
3. Did the application judge err in determining that Canada’s decision was reasonable?
Holding:
Appeal dismissed. The removal order was temporarily stayed for 60 days from the release of the Court’s decision.
Reasoning:
1. The Court, relying on prior jurisprudence, began by defining Crown prerogative. Crown prerogative is the residue of arbitrary authority that is left in the hands of the Crown. Clear and explicit statutory language is required to displace the jurisdiction of provincial Superior Courts, since they are courts of inherent jurisdiction. The Court distinguished Federal Courts, stating that the same principles did not apply to them, since they are purely statutory courts. As a result, the Court concluded that all applications for judicial review of exercises of Crown prerogative can be brought before superior courts because their inherent jurisdiction allows them to hear all matters except those that are excluded by statute. However, the Court also stated that Crown prerogative may be limited or displaced by statute through explicit statutory language. In such cases, Crown prerogative is only displaced to the extent that the statute displaces it whether explicitly or by necessary implication.
The Court interpreted the Federal Courts Act to determine if it displaced the Superior Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The Court held that while section 18(1)(a) of the Federal Courts Act gives the Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction over any “federal board, commission or other tribunal,” section 2 limits it to exercises of the Crown prerogative “established by or under an order made under the prerogative of the Crown.” The Court concluded that, together, these provisions meant that exercises of Crown prerogative not made by or under an order are not displaced by the statute. Lastly, the Court rejected the respondent’s argument that the decision was not an exercise of Crown prerogative, but an exercise of statutory power made pursuant to the IRPA. The Court recognized that a removal order under section 115 of the IRPA is a decision made pursuant to federal legislation and, as such, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. However, the Court drew a distinction between that decision and the decision not to hold MS’ deportation in abeyance at the request of the UNHRC. The Court concluded that the prerogative was not exercised pursuant to an order made by Parliament, but instead, it was a response to an international body. Moreover, the Court noted that this authority to respond to a diplomatic request from an international organization does not stem from the IRPA and is therefore discretionary. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Superior Court retained jurisdiction to hear the matter.
2. The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that characterizing the decision as justiciable would risk converting a non-binding request in a Protocol into Canadian law. The Court distinguished the caselaw relied upon by the respondents, noting that the cases did not address justiciability and that the grounds for relief in those cases were different. The Court held that justiciability exists on a sliding scale. The Court identified two types of decisions: (1) matters of “high policy” such as decisions to go to war or sign treaties, which cannot be reviewed, and (2) decisions that directly implicate the rights of individuals or legitimate expectations of individuals and are therefore reviewable. Although the Court agreed that MS had no expectation or right to remain in Canada until the UNHRC provided its views, the Court concluded that the decision not to hold MS’ refugee removal order in abeyance was of great importance to him. As a result, the Court determined that the decision was justiciable.
3. The Court upheld the decision of the application judge, stating that it was not unreasonable. MS submitted that the Minister was required to justify the decision given its harsh consequences under the principle of responsive justification. However, the Minister argued that there are no rights to reasons because reasons are not customarily provided for IMRs. Further, the respondent argued that the principle of responsive justification did not apply in the present case because the decision was in response to a request from the UNHRC, therefore the Optional Protocol requires Canada to respond to UNHRC, not MS. The Court agreed with this reasoning, emphasizing that MS was not a party to the request. The Court also noted that there is nothing in the UNHRC’s rules or the signed Protocols that indicated that reasons were required for the decision of the IMR. Moreover, the Court held that Canada was free to decline MS’ request for reasoning because the IMRs issued by the UNHRC are not binding under Canadian law. Finally, the Court concluded that the common law duty of procedural fairness did not require reasons.
MS also argued that the decision itself was not reasonable because Canada did not consider MS’ situation. However, Canada disputed these claims, stating that it had all the relevant information when making its decision. The Court concluded that the decision itself was reasonable. First, the Court began by explaining that where no reasons are provided, reasonableness will be determined from the record before the court. The Court found that the Danger Opinion was a significant part of the record. While the Danger Opinion was missing information, the Court acknowledged that the Minister also had all the information MS submitted to the UNHRC. Although MS’ formal diagnoses and psychiatric report were not before the Minister, these documents post-dated MS’ communication and were not included in judicial review absent certain exceptions, which did not apply. The Court therefore concluded that the decision was reasonable.
In the second part of its analysis, the Court considered Canada’s legal obligations. The Court rejected MS’ claim that Vavilov required the Minister to consider Canada’s legal obligations under international Covenants, Optional Protocols, and customary international law of non-refoulement (a prohibition of returning a refugee to a country where they would face persecution). MS further argued that decision makers may be constrained by international treaties that have not been incorporated into domestic law. The Court rejected this argument, holding that international instruments cannot create binding domestic obligations when Parliament has expressly chosen not to adopt them. The Court noted that neither the UNHRC’s views nor its IMRs are binding on Canada, and that the Optional Protocol cannot require Canada to delay enforcement of its domestic laws pending the UNHRC’s consideration. Relying on Suresh, the Court held that Canada’s international obligations inform the interpretation of the Charter and the IRPA, but that the principle of non-refoulement is subject to the exception in section 115(2) of the IRPA, which the Supreme Court has found to be constitutional. The Court reiterated that the principle against refoulement is a cornerstone of the international refugee protection regime. As a result, the decision to remove MS in accordance with the Danger Opinion provided under section 115(2) was not inconsistent with the principle of non-refoulement as it is construed in domestic law.
Trebell v. Canada Life Assurance Company, 2026 ONCA 481
[Simmons, Paciocco and Osborne JJ.A.]
Counsel:
J.Galway, S. Rajayer and R. Grima, for the appellant
P.H. Horgan and R.T.R. Fernandes, for the respondent S.R.W.T.
M. Krygier-Baum, for the respondent D.M.K.
L. Plumpton, for the intervener Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association Inc.
Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Life Insurance, Conditions Precedent, Change in Insurability, Statutory Interpretation, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Insurance Act R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, Life Insurance Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. L-14, An Act to amend The Insurance Act, S.O. 1961-62, c. 63, Ontario Securities Commission v. Tiffin, 2020 ONCA 217, Ledcor Construction Ltd. v. Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co., 2016 SCC 37, Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2025 SCC 15, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd. v. Canadian Air Line Pilots Assn., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 724, Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37, Hunt v. Canada, 2026 FCA 88, R. v. Rafilovich, 2019 SCC 51, R. v. Basque, 2023 SCC 18, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, R. v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, Wagner Brothers Holdings Inc. v. Laurier Life Insurance Co. (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 609 (C.A.), Ryan v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (1999), 179 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 306 (N.L. C.A.), Beattie v. National Frontier Insurance Co. (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 60 (C.A.), Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), 2006 SCC 20, R. v. Shearing, 2002 SCC 58, Kosicki v. Toronto (City), 2025 SCC 28, Saskatchewan River Bungalows v. Maritime Life Assurance Co., [1994] 2 S.C.R. 490, The Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York v. Mowat (1902), 32 S.C.R. 147, Donovan v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. (1916), 53 S.C.R. 539, Patterson v. Gallant, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1080, Nuraney v. MBA Insurance Brokers Inc. (1989), 38 C.C.L.I. 243 (Ont. H.C.J.), Beldent c. Sun Life du Canada, compagnie d’assurance-vie, 1997 CanLII 10112 (Q.C. C.A.), General Trust of Canada v. Artisans Coopvie, Société Coopérative d’Assurance-vie, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1185, Van Huizen v. Trisura Guarantee Insurance Company, 2020 ONCA 222, McCunn Estate v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 304 (C.A.), Miller Paving Limited v. B. Gottardo Construction Ltd., 2007 ONCA 422, Lee v. 1435375 Ontario Ltd., 2013 ONCA 516, Ramey v. Maritime Life Assurance Co. (1972), 2 O.R. 169 (H.C.J.), R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, Pagliaroli v. Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc., 2012 ONSC 6862, Anderson Estate v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 2005 SKCA 130, Emond v. Trillium Mutual Insurance Co., 2026 SCC 3, Sabean v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Co., 2017 SCC 7, MacDonald v. Chicago Title Insurance Co. of Canada, 2015 ONCA 842, Ashak v. Ontario (Family Responsibility Office), 2013 ONCA 375, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Markham: Butterworths, 2002), General Principles of Canadian Insurance Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2026) (online), Detailed Report of the Superintendent of Insurance and Registrar of Friendly Societies (Toronto: Clarkson W. James, 1924), he Uniform Life Insurance Act of Canada, 2nd ed. (The Life Underwriters Association of Canada, 1937), Superintendent’s 1924 Report, MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 9th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), The Construction of Statutes, 7th ed., Norwood on Life Insurance Law in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2002)
Facts:
Ms. T applied to Canada Life for a life insurance policy and cancelled her existing policy. While awaiting delivery of the Policy, Ms. T was treated for some health issues. Ms. T had a history of these health issues. She underwent an exploratory procedure that was not fully completed due to physical discomfort. She was recommended further exploratory procedures to screen for cancer.
The Policy was eventually delivered to Ms. T. At the time, Canada Life was unaware of any health concerns, and the procedure was still pending. That same day, Ms. T signed a delivery receipt that included a declaration that there had been no change in her insurability, including her health status, since she completed the application.
The procedure was performed and revealed a large lesion which a biopsy confirmed to be malignant. Sadly, the cancer took Ms. T’s life, leading to Mr. T’s claim.
Canada Life confirmed that it relied on this medical history to conclude that there had been a change in insurability between the application and the delivery of the Policy that prevented the contract from taking effect pursuant to s. 180(1)(c) of the Insurance Act. Section 180(1)(c) sets out a condition precedent for the formation of a life insurance contract. Where a change in insurability occurs between application and policy delivery, no contract forms and the insurer may deny coverage on this basis, regardless of the amount of time that has passed.
A medical doctor employed by Canada Life provided the opinion that if Canada Life had known about the bleeding, pain, and medical examinations that were underway, it would have postponed the delivery of the Policy, pending the results of the colonoscopy. Hence, the denial of the claim.
As a result of the denial of the designated respondent Policy beneficiary’s claim, the respondent sued London Life’s successor corporation, the appellant The Canada Life Assurance Company and Ms. T’s insurance agent, the respondent D.K.
The motion judge granted Mr. T summary judgment against Canada Life for the full amount of the Policy, plus interest, after concluding that “s. 180(1)(c) does not permit Canada Life to reach back into [Ms. T’s] medical records” and raise insurability issues beyond a two-year period specified in s. 184(2) of the Act.
Issues:
1. Did the motion judge err in imposing a two-year contestability limitation on the operation of s. 180(1)(c)?
2. Should the summary judgment be upheld based on the prospective interpretation of s. 180(1)(c)?
3. Did the Policy oust s. 180(1)(c) in any event?
Holding:
Appeal allowed.
Reasoning:
1. Yes. The motion judge erred by imposing a two-year contestability limitation on the operation of s. 180(1)(c). The two-year contestability limitation in s. 184(2) is unrelated to the text of s. 180(1)(c) and divorced from its context and purpose. It cannot be imported into the application of s. 180(1)(c). Section184(2) is solely directed to voiding events identified in s. 183.
Further, the parties did not contract out of s. 180(1)(c), and there were no provisions in the Policy that could oust its application.
2. No. The summary judgment should not be upheld based on the prospective interpretation of s. 180(1)(c). The purpose of s. 180(1)(c) is to ensure a meeting of the minds during contract formation. The Court held that a textual, contextual and purposive analysis of s. 180(1)(c) requires it to be construed as a condition precedent of contract formation. The provision does not require change in the factual state of the risk undertaken by the insurer in insuring the insured. Where this requirement is not met, the contract of insurance does not exist. Accordingly, s. 180(1)(c) can be relied upon at any time by the insurer to resist a claim for life insurance benefits.
3. No. The Policy did not oust s. 180(1)(c) in any event. Section 180(1) may be displaced by the terms of the Policy, since, by its terms, the operation of s. 180(1) is subject to any provision to the contrary in the application or a policy. The Policy’s incontestability clause, in the context of the contract, concludes that it does not oust s. 180(1), but in fact incorporates its requirements for determining when the contract, and hence the Policy, would take effect.
Paterson v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2026 ONCA 480
[van Rensburg, Dawe and Madsen JJ.A.]
Counsel:
M.P. Tunley, for the appellant
W. C. McDowell, E. Linn and M. Faulkner, for the respondents
Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Conspiracy to Injure, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Ultimate Limitation Period, Wilful Concealment, Striking Pleadings, Abuse of Process, Collateral Attack, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, s. 15, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21, Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79 (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 541, York Condominium Corporation No. 382 v. Jay-M Holdings Limited, 2007 ONCA 49, Kaynes v. BP plc, 2021 ONCA 36, 456 D.L.R. (4th) 247, Das v. George Weston Limited, 2018 ONCA 1053, Zeppav. Woodbridge Heating & Air-Conditioning Ltd., 2019 ONCA 47, M(K) v. M(H), [1992] 3 SCR 6, King v. Victor Parsons & Co., [1973] 1 All E.R. 206 (C.A.), Taylor v. David, 2021 ONSC 3264, Bongard v. Bullen, 2025 ONCA 473, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, Johnson v. Studley, 2014 ONSC 1732, Bhoola v. Vaughan (City), 2024 ONSC 103, Johnston v. Griffiths, 2025 ONSC 2048
Facts:
The appellant appeals the order striking out his Statement of Claim on a motion under r. 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellant commenced an action in May 2022 claiming that, decades earlier, the respondents had engaged in a campaign to defame and injure him, including by pressuring the Ontario Securities Commission to investigate and take proceedings against him and the brokerage firm where he was Chair and Chief Executive Officer.
The motion judge held that the claims asserted in the Statement of Claim were barred by the expiry of the ultimate 15-year limitation period under s. 15 of the Limitations Act, 2002. He rejected the appellant’s argument that the running of the ultimate limitation period was interrupted by the respondents’ wilful concealment of material facts. The motion judge also struck the Statement of Claim as an abuse of process, concluding, among other things, that it improperly impugned the OSC proceedings.
The appellant asserted that the respondents wilfully concealed from him that any injury, loss and damage he was suffering was caused or contributed to by their wrongful conduct, and wilfully misled the appellant and the business community to believe he would have no legal claim against them because any injury, loss and damage would appear to be the result of independent journalists, regulators and other third persons.
Issues:
Was it plain and obvious that the appellants claim was statute-barred?
Holding:
Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
Yes. An appeal from a determination of a question of law under r. 21.01(1), applies the correctness standard of review.
The rationale for the interruption of the ultimate limitation period during a period of wilful concealment or wilful misleading is to prevent unfairness to a plaintiff that would result if such conduct by a defendant prevented them from knowing they had a claim. There would be no unfairness if, notwithstanding such conduct, the claim was known or discoverable. If, notwithstanding the defendant’s best efforts, the plaintiff knows of the cause of action and the appropriateness of bringing a proceeding, the causal link is absent, and wilful concealment no longer operates to suspend the ultimate limitation period.
While there may be details of which he was not aware, the appellant was aware of a sufficient number of instances before 2002 of statements by the respondents that were designed and intended to harm his career. The Court agreed that some of the respondents’ actions may have been covert and unknown to the appellant, however, according to the Statement of Claim, the respondents also acted openly and directly. The Statement of Claim made it clear that the appellant knew, at the time, that individuals affiliated with RBC DS were defaming him to clients and the business community at large, asserting that he was unethical and lacked integrity. Even if the appellant was unaware of the specifics of their role in a campaign against him, there was nothing in the pleading to suggest that the respondents were concealing from the appellant their concerted intent to damage his reputation and professional standing. The respondents were not subtle about their combined efforts to injure him. Accordingly, the motion judge did not err in examining the Statement of Claim to determine whether, according to the appellant’s own pleadings, he had knowledge of the claims.
UM Financial Inc. v. Central 1 Credit Union, 2026 ONCA 475
[Tulloch, Sossin, O’Marra, JJ.A.]
Counsel:
P. Draguieva, for the appellant N.S.
P.I. Waldmann, for the appellant O.K.
D. Dutt, D.B.B. Stewart, and S. Rus, for the respondent Central 1 Credit Union
N.S. Rabinovitch, for the respondent Grant Thornton Ltd.
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigation, Frivolous, Vexatious, Abuse of Process, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 140, College of Registered Nurses of Manitoba v. Hancock, 2023 MBCA 70, Barry v. Anantharajah, 2025 ONCA 603, Brad-Jay Investments Ltd. v. Szijjarto (2006), 218 O.A.C. 315 (C.A.), Lenczner Slaght LLP v. GlycoBioSciences Inc., 2025 ONCA 841, Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, Leitch v. Novac, 2020 ONCA 257, McLean v. Connell, 2025 ONCA 495, Lochner v. Ontario Civilian Police Commission, 2020 ONCA 720, Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 4, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chavali (1998), 31 C.P.C. (4th) 221 (Ont. C.A.), Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 59, Re Lang Michener and Fabian (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 353 (H.C.), Jonsson v. Lymer, 2020 ABCA 167, Schwilgin v. Szivy, 2015 ONCA 816, 1318847 Ontario Limited v. Laval Tool & Mould Ltd., 2017 ONCA 184, Saccon (Litigation Guardian of) v. Sisson (1992), 9 C.P.C. (3d) 383 (Ont. Gen. Div.)
Facts:
The litigation has its origin in lending arrangements entered into between Central 1 Credit Union and UM, together with an affiliated entity, UM Capital Inc., beginning in or around 2005. The purpose of that financing was to support the development and facilitation of shariah-compliant mortgage products.
There is a lengthy history of proceedings brought by UM, related entities, and individuals associated with them against the respondents including a 2011 action by the UM companies, a 2014 human rights complaint and civil action by Dr. K, and a further action and proposed class proceeding commenced in 2021. The allegations shifted somewhat in form but repeatedly returned to the same core themes: the lending relationship, the alleged withdrawal or mishandling of funding, the commencement of a receivership and alleged losses said to have flowed from those events. Those proceedings were dismissed on various grounds.
On February 29, 2024, UM commenced the present action against the respondents, claiming damages of $5 million for breach of contract, negligence and misrepresentation. The theory advanced in the action, as the motion judge understood it, was that the respondents had misled UM and the courts concerning the effect of a respondent’s discharge as receiver, and that this had prejudiced UM in earlier proceedings. Mr. S became one of UM’s directors on January 14, 2025, after the action was commenced.
The respondents moved to dismiss the action and sought broader relief, including a vexatious litigant order against UM, the appellants and related persons. The respondents also sought costs against Mr. S and his fellow directors personally. The motion judge dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process and made a vexatious litigant order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act (CJA).
Issues:
1. Did the motion judge err in making an order under section 140 of the CJA against the appellants?
2. Did the motion judge err in ordering that Mr. S be jointly and severally liable with UM for costs?
Holding:
Appeal dismissed.
Reasoning:
1. No, the motion judge did not err in making an order under section 140 of the CJA against the appellants.
Section 140 of the CJA authorizes orders against vexatious non-parties because it furthers the provision’s purpose of preventing vexatious litigation from draining the time, energy and resources of innocent parties and the courts.
Second, the Court held that the appellants met the threshold of section 140. The motion judge properly rejected Dr. K’s attempt to use UM’s purported leadership change to shield himself from accountability. That change did not erase the motion judge’s finding that Dr. K directed prior vexatious proceedings. As the motion judge further found, Dr. K orchestrated the present action from behind the scenes even after his alleged departure from the company.
The motion judge also appropriately held Mr. S accountable for his conduct of the proceeding. When Mr. S joined the board after the historical proceedings and the commencement of the present action, the motion judge found that he allowed himself to be used as a “puppet” for UM and Dr. K. The motion judge further found that he spoke with Dr. K before cross-examination and allowed him to influence the litigation from behind the scenes.
Lastly, the Court held that the motion judge properly exercised its discretion in his section 140 order. Section 140 orders should be purposive, proportionate and tailored. The motion judge’s exercise of discretion respected these principles. The motion judge properly determined that the order had to extend beyond UM itself to effectively advance section 140’s aims. The record showed repeated use of related individuals and entities in advancing substantially the same claims as well as the presence of “invisible litigants” like Dr. K who sought to direct litigation from behind the scenes. Additionally, the motion judge appropriately concluded that lesser remedies would be ineffective. As he found, both appellants ignored court orders and Dr. K had not paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in outstanding cost awards. Ordering costs that are unlikely to ever be paid is an illusory remedy, not an effective alternative.
2. No, the motion judge did not err in ordering that Mr. S be jointly and severally liable with UM for costs. It is well established that costs may, in exceptional circumstances, be awarded against non-parties who are directors or principals of corporations where their gross misconduct, vexatious behaviour or other acts that undermine the fair administration of justice amount to an abuse of process.
Here, the motion judge properly grounded the order in specific findings about Mr. S’s conduct as a deponent and participant in the litigation. In the circumstances, it was open to the motion judge to conclude that Mr. S’s conduct contributed to the continuation of abusive litigation, undermined the fair administration of justice and justified personal costs consequences. The order was discretionary. No error in principle had been shown, and the result could not be said to be plainly wrong. Because the appellants had not shown strong grounds for appellate intervention, leave to appeal the costs was denied.
SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS
Avida 2015 Inc (Re), 2026 ONCA 478
[Zarnett J.A.]
Counsel:
David T. Ullman, for the appellant
C. Staples, for the respondent
P. Corney, for the trustee
Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Property of the Bankrupt, Choses in Action, Liquidation, Credit Bids, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Interveners, Avida 2015 Inc. (Re), 2026 ONCA 426
Natario v. RBC Insurance Company of Canada, 2026 ONCA 482
[Roberts, Coroza and Sossin JJ.A.]
Counsel:
D. Zarek and A. Reyes, for the appellants
M. Rotondo and D. Kapanadze, for the respondent
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Occupier’s Liability, Contracts, Insurance, Defences, Fraud, Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 132(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 26.01
McClory v. Laird, 2026 ONCA 483
[Roberts, Coroza and Wilson JJ.A.]
Counsel:
P. Cornish, for the appellant/respondent by way of cross-appeal
C. Patterson, for the respondents/appellants by way of cross-appeal
Keywords: Wills and Estates, Estate Administration, Passing of Accounts, Civil Procedure, Applications, Abandonment, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.14(3)
Cusnir v. Taylor, 2026 ONCA 470
[Tulloch C.J.O., Rouleau and Lauwers JJ.A.]
Counsel:
F.D.C. a.k.a. D.C., acting in person
B. Rideout and S. Jakovljevic, for the respondent
L. Day and R. Stefanelli, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agency, Insurance, Torts, Professional Negligence, Real Estate Brokers, Civil Procedure, Abuse of Process, Costs, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 132, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 30, Sched. C, ss. 4 & 9, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 25.06(1), Girao v Cunningham, 2021 ONCA 18, Benarroch v Fred Tayar & Associates P.C., 2019 ONCA 228, Fong v Chan (1999), 46 OR (3d) 330 (CA)
SPM Charters Inc. v. Flightpath Charter Airways Inc., 2026 ONCA 471
[Tulloch C.J.O., Lauwers and Miller JJ.A.]
Counsel:
Y. Sun and C. Liang, for the appellants
C. Dirks, for the respondent
D. Booth, for the respondent
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 13 & 19, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20 & 20.05, Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, Tomec v Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 839
Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Peel v. A.W., 2026 ONCA 477
[Thorburn, Madsen and Rahman JJ.A.]
Counsel:
A.W., acting in person
S.W., acting in person
K. Williams, for the respondent
M. Leonard, for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer on behalf of the Child
Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Child Protection, Best Interests of the Child, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Child, Youth, and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, s. 74(2)(h), Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12
Never Forgotten National Memorial Foundation v. Canada (Parks), 2026 ONCA 489
[Roberts, Thorburn and Coroza JJ.A.]
Counsel:
D. Fogel and J. Vale, for the appellant
J. Schneider, for the respondent
Keywords: Breach of Contract, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Summary Judgment, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, ss. 2, 4 & 16(1)(a)
[Roberts, Coroza and Pomerance JJ.A.]
Counsel:
D.J.R., acting in person
A. Monadjem, appearing as amicus curiae, Pro Brono Ontario
M. Sims, for the respondent
C. Fiske and T. Adhihetty, for the respondent
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Settlements
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