Congratulations to our very own David Ullmann and Nadav Amar for getting leave to appeal on a point of law as to whether a secured creditor whose security does not attach to an asset of the bankrupt can submit a credit bid to acquire that asset from the trustee in bankruptcy. The asset in question is a proposed claim against the creditor making the bid.
In Wallbridge v. Poupore, the Court allowed the appeal in part. A former lawyer was paid while employed by his old firm a percentage of settlements or judgments recovered on files the lawyer had worked on. After leaving, the lawyer claimed his old firm owed him compensation for files he had worked on but that had not been resolved until after his departure. The motion judge agreed with him, but the Court disagreed and set aside that aspect of the motion judge’s decision.
In Diep v. Mac’s Convenience Stores Inc., the Court dismissed an appeal by a parking lot owner and snow maintenance company who argued that damages awarded to the respondent should be reduced by the statutory accident benefits he received from his car insurer. The respondent was injured after slipping on ice in a convenience store parking lot. The Court upheld the motion judge’s finding that the respondent’s negligence and occupiers’ liability claims did not arise “directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile” within the meaning of the Insurance Act, as the dominant cause of the loss was the appellants’ failure to maintain the parking lot. The Court also confirmed that OHIP’s subrogated claims were not precluded by the Health Insurance Act and that the doctrines of abuse of process and issue estoppel did not apply.
In Mazzeo v Mazzeo, the parties share custody of a minor child whose primary residence is with the father in California. The mother who lives in Ontario, has not returned the child pursuant to the custody agreement. A California judge has ordered the child returned to the father.
In James v HSBC Bank of Canada, the Court dismissed the main appeal from a summary judgment decision that dismissed the appellant’s action against the bank. The appellant sued the bank after it froze his accounts following suspicious deposits, criminal charges and a Criminal Code restraint order. The appellant was ultimately acquitted of all charges. The appellant argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because of the respondents’ delay in bringing the motion and that the motion judge misapprehended the evidence. The Court rejected these arguments. Although the motion judge should have addressed the bank’s delay in brining the motion, ultimately, the case was suitable for summary judgment. There was no imminent trial date that was derailed as a result of the motion. Furthermore, the motion judge’s factual findings were supported by the record. However, the Court did granted leave to appeal the costs award and reduced the substantial indemnity costs awarded against the appellant from $225,000 to $175,000.
In Lloyd v. Baker, the Court allowed the appeal and dismissed an MVA claim commenced six years after the accident. The respondent argued the claim was not discoverable until she met with a neuropsychologist several years after the accident. The Court found that the respondent’s claim was discoverable much earlier and was therefore out of time.
In Singh v Persaud, the Court dismissed an appeal from a trial judgment ordering the appellant to transfer title to a property to the respondent and declaring the respondent sole beneficial owner pursuant to a Statutory Declaration and Acknowledgement of Trust. The Court also found no error in the award of punitive damages award of $10,000.
In Bridging Finance Inc. v. Sharpe, the Court dismissed an appeal by an offshore trust company that was involved in the fraudulent transfer of funds to an offshore trust account. The Trust company had argued that Ontario did not have jurisdiction to hear this issue or that Ontario was otherwise forum non conveniens. However, the alleged fraud and underlying contract formation occurred in Ontario therefore Ontario had jurisdiction.
In Block Developments Inc. v. Brewers Retail Inc., the Court dismissed an appeal challenging the trial judge’s $15.5 million damages award for breach of two agreements of purchase and sale involving development properties. The Court held that the trial judge did not err in accepting a lost development profits approach endorsed by both parties’ experts. This approach differed from the approach rejected in Rosseau Group because it used the breach date as the assessment date, applied a discount rate reflecting what a reasonable party would pay for projected cash flows considering risk and the time value of money, and was the same approach taken by Brewers’ own experts. The Court also upheld the trial judge’s finding that purchases made by Block’s affiliates post-breach were independent transactions that did not constitute mitigation, as Brewers failed to establish a causal link between its breach and Block’s ability to mitigate.
In Brown v. Meaney, the Court dismissed the appeal of two pediatric neurologists found liable for negligence in their treatment of an infant born with a rare vitamin B6-dependent seizure disorder. The Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the appellants breached the standard of care by prematurely ruling out the disorder without completing the diagnostic process. The appellants had also failed to obtain informed consent by not discussing the diagnostic process and associated risks with the patient’s parents. Finally, the Court upheld the trial judge’s assessment that the appellants’ negligence caused the patient’s brain injury and developmental delay by way of the commonsense application of the “but for” test.
John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email
Table of Contents
Civil Decisions
Wallbridge, Wallbridge v. Poupore, 2026 ONCA 417
Keywords: Contracts, Employment, Remuneration, Commissions, Unjust Enrichment, Quantum Meruit, Dumbrell v. The Regional Group of Companies Inc., 2007 ONCA 59, Charles P. Rowen & Associates Inc. et al v. Ciba-Geigy Canada Inc. (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 205 (C.A.)
Diep v. Mac’s Convenience Stores Inc., 2026 ONCA 424
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Occupier’s Liability, Slip and Fall, Damages, Contracts, Insurance, Automobile, Statutory Accident Benefits, Health Care Costs, Civil Procedure, Determination of Question of Law, Issue Estoppel, Abuse of Process, Occupiers Liability Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. O.2., Insurance Act R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8., Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8., Automobile Insurance Rate Stability Act, 1996 (Bill 59), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(a), El-Khodr v. Lackie, 2017 ONCA 716, Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care) v. Georgiou, 2002 CanLII 45036 (ON CA), Greenhalgh v. ING Halifax Insurance Co., 2004 CanLII 21045 (ON CA), Heredi v. Fensom, 2002 SCC 50, Hernandez v. 1206625 Ontario Inc., 2002 CanLII 45089 (ON CA), Davis v. Aviva General Insurance Co., 2024 ONSC 3054, Air Canada v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161, Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, Budd v. Paterson (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 715 (C.A.), Amos v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 405, Smith v. Co-Operators General Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 30, Tomec v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 882, Coban v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2026 ONSC 1925
Mazzeo v. Mazzeo, 2026 ONCA 447
Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Relocation, Child Abduction, Best Interests of the Child, Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35, RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 31, D.C. v T.B., 2021 ONCA 562, K.K. v. M.M., 2021 ONCA 407, Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16
James v HSBC Bank of Canada, 2026 ONCA 440
Keywords: Contracts, Banking, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Substantial Indemnity Costs, Proportionality, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 49.10, 57.01, Avedian v Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. (Enbridge Gas Distribution), 2021 ONCA 361, Doef v Hockey Canada et al., 2022 ONSC 1411, Clarington (Municipality) v Blue Circle Canada Inc., 2009 ONCA 722
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, MVA, Permanent Serious Impairment, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, ss. 4, 5, Sched. B, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 267.5, Sanei v. Debarros, 2024 ONCA 104, Everding v. Skrijel, 2010 ONCA 437, Fennell v. Deol, 2016 ONCA 249, Peixeiro v. Haberman, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 549
Singh v Persaud, 2026 ONCA 435
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Property Law, Contracts, Interpretation, Trusts, Ownership, Intent, Transfer of Title, Statutory Declaration, Acknowledgement of Trust, ex turpi causa, Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Sattva Capital Corp. v Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, R v Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, Seelster Farms et al v Her Majesty the Queen and OLG, 2020 ONSC 4013, Upper Canada v Guardian Insurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 21, Waxman v Waxman (2004), 186 OAC 201 (CA), Scott v Golden Oaks Enterprises Inc., 2024 SCC 32, R v GF, 2021 SCC 20
Bridging Finance Inc. v. Sharpe, 2026 ONCA 432
Keywords: Contracts, Trusts, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Torts, Fraud, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Forum Non conveniens, Notices of Motion, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 37.01, 2249659 Ontario Ltd. v. Sparkasse Siegen, 2013 ONCA 354, Haaretz.com v. Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28, Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melancon LLP v. Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2016 SCC 30, Kyko Global Inc. v. M/S Crawford Bayley & Co., 2021 ONCA 736, Sinclair v. Venezia Turismo, 2025 SCC 7, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, 2183164 Ontario Inc. v. Gillani, 2013 ONSC 1456, Laxton v. Anstalt, 2011 BCCA 212
Block Developments Inc. v. Brewers Retail Inc., 2026 ONCA 431
Keywords:Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Damages, Defences, Mitigation, The Rosseau Group Inc. v. 2528061 Ontario Inc., 2023 ONCA 814, Southcott Estates Inc. v. Toronto Catholic District School Board, 2012 SCC 51, Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., 2002 SCC 19, Naylor Group Inc. v. Ellis-Don Construction Ltd., 2001 SCC 58, Rougemount Capital Inc. v. Computer Associates International Inc., 2016 ONCA 847, TMS Lighting Ltd. v. KJS Transport Inc., 2014 ONCA 1, SFC Litigation Trust v. Chan, 2019 ONCA 525, 100 Main Street Ltd. v. W.B. Sullivan Construction Ltd. (1978), 1978 CanLII 1630 (ON CA), 642947 Ontario Ltd. v. Fleischer, 2001 CanLII 8623 (ON CA), Remington Development Corporation v. Canadian Pacific Railway Company, 2025 ABCA 244, Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass, 2000 SCC 52, St. John’s (City) v. Lynch, 2024 SCC 17, Asamera Oil Corp. v. Sea Oil and General Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633, Akelius Canada Ltd. v. 2436196 Ontario Inc., 2022 ONCA 259, Kinbauri Gold Corp. v. Iamgold International African Mining Gold Corp., 2004 CanLII 36051 (ON CA), Gholami v. The Hospital for Sick Children, 2018 ONCA 783, British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., 2004 SCC 38, Scott v. Forjani, 2021 ONSC 1996, 345176 Canada Inc. et al. v. James Selkirk Custom Homes Ltd, 2026 ONSC 600, Medway v. Manitoba (Department of Urban Affairs)(1983), 29 L.C.R. 89, 1427814 Ontario Limited v. 3697584 Canada Inc., 2012 ONSC 156, Northern Meat Packers Ltd. v. Roynat Ltd., 1986 CanLII 135 (NB CA), BCE Place Limited v. Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, 2010 ONCA 672, British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd., [1912] A.C. 673 (H.L.)
Brown v. Meaney , 2026 ONCA 445
Keywords:Torts, Negligence, MedMal, Standard of Care, Informed Consent, Causation, “But For” Test, Sylvester v. Crits et al., 1956 CanLII 34 (ON CA), ter Neuzen v. Korn, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674, Flood v. Boutette, 2021 ONCA 515, Denman v. Radovanovic, 2024 ONCA 276, Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119, Van Dyke v. Grey Bruce Regional Health Centre, (2005), 255 D.L.R. (4th) 397 (Ont. C.A.), Hopp v. Lepp, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 192, Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, Cheung v. Samra, 2022 ONCA 195, Welton v. United Lands Corporation Limited, 2020 ONCA 322
Short Civil Decisions
Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Readymix Foods Corporation, 2026 ONCA 423
Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Guarantees, Consideration, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, TD Canada Trust v. B & B Enterprises (London) Ltd., 2008 ONCA 441, Villeneuve v. Turner, [1990] O.J. No. 385 (Dis. Ct.)
T.C.O. Agromart Ltd. v. Sutton Farms (Nacona) Ltd., 2026 ONCA 437
Keywords:Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs, T.C.O. Agromart Ltd. v. Sutton Farms (Nacona) Ltd., 2026 ONCA 371
Rosehaven Homes Limited v. Jamil, 2026 ONCA 446
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Damages, Arista Homes v. Rahnama, 2022 ONCA 759, 642947 Ontario Ltd. v. Fleischer (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), 100 Main Street Ltd. v. W.B. Sullivan Construction Ltd. (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 401 (C.A.), Marshall v. Meirik, 2021 ONSC 1687, Marshall v. Meirik, 2022 ONCA 275
M.M. v. Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, 2026 ONCA 442
Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Child Protection, Crown Wardship, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Fresh Evidence, Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s 2
Johnson v. Johnson, 2026 ONCA 448
Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Dismissal for Delay, Evidence, Trans, Case Management, Reviews, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 7(5), Rules of Civil Procedure, r 61.13(1)(a), Johnson v. Johnson, 2026 ONCA 189
H.E-S. v. Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region, 2026 ONCA 443
Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Child Protection, Crown Wardship, Child Youth and Family Services Act, S.O. 2017, c. C14, s 102, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss 19(1), (a.1)
Bank of Montreal v. Khello, 2026 ONCA 441
Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Orders, Final or Interlocutory
Avida 2015 Inc. (Re), 2026 ONCA 426
Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Property of the Bankrupt, Choses in Action, Liquidation, Credit Bids, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s 193, Business Development Bank of Canada v. Pine Tree Resorts Inc., 2013 ONCA 282.
Winning v. 2483852 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 452
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Conditions Precedent
Peninsula Employment Services Ltd v. Castillo, 2026 ONCA 450
Keywords: Contracts, Settlements, Civil Procedure, Disclosure, Abuse of Process, 1086289 Ontario Inc. (Urban Electrical Contractors) v. Welland (City), 2026 ONCA 352, Handley Estate v. DTE Industries Limited, 2018 ONCA 324
Berentschot v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 444
Keywords: Constitutional Law, International Law, Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigation, Abuse of Process, Frivolous, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Contraventions Act, S.C. 1992, c. 47, Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 17, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43., Rules of Civil Procedure, r 2.1.01, Fabrikant v. Kelly, 2023 ONCA 579, Ahmed v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 ONCA 427, Joshi v. Ontario, 2019 ONSC 2444, Poorkid Investments Inc. v. Ontario (Solicitor General), 2023 ONCA 172, Guindon v. Canada, 2015 SCC 41
CIVIL DECISIONS
Wallbridge, Wallbridge v. Poupore, 2026 ONCA 417
Simmons, Miller, Wilson
Counsel:
G. Adair, for the appellant
M. Davis, R. Davis, and Y. Kogan, for respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Employment, Remuneration, Commissions, Unjust Enrichment, Quantum Meruit, Dumbrell v. The Regional Group of Companies Inc., 2007 ONCA 59, Charles P. Rowen & Associates Inc. et al v. Ciba-Geigy Canada Inc. (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 205 (C.A.)
facts:
The respondent, PP, was a personal injury lawyer at the appellant law firm. The respondent was paid pursuant to a contingency fee agreement wherein they were to be paid a commission when a file was brought to completion. In February 2021, PP began discussions with another law firm to establish a competing office in Sudbury. The two parties signed a contract on June 15, 2021, stipulating that PP was to commence employment with the new firm on October 18, 2021. In the meantime, PP continued his employment with the appellant while also looking for an office space for the new firm. On October 1, 2021, PP advised the appellant of his plans to leave, and his employment was immediately terminated thereafter. The parties subsequently disagreed as to their respective professional obligations to the clients of the firm. The appellant then brought an action for damages against PP and sought a declaration that PP was not entitled to any compensation for Work in Progress that was unbilled as of February 1, 2021. The appellant claimed that they would have terminated PP’s employment on February 1, 2021, had they known about the agreement with the other firm. The appellant also sought damages against P.P, the new law firm, and against PP’s assistant and law clerk who also left the appellant law firm with PP. However, the appellant discontinued all these other claims. Only the claims against PP remained. PP bought a counterclaim against the appellant law firm seeking damages for breach of contract or unjust enrichment.
The appellant argued that PP’s entitlement to compensation ended when his employment was terminated. This included any fees arising from files under the carriage of PP that were not paid to PP before his departure. At trial, three types of fees were in dispute: (1) fees billed by PP and collected by the appellant a month before PP’s termination; (2) fees collected by the appellant after termination for files under PP’s carriage but transferred to other firm lawyers; and (3) fees from three settlements PP negotiated at the appellant firm for clients who followed PP to the new firm.
The parties brought motions for summary judgement to resolve the entitlement issues. The motion judge found that PP’s terms of employment at the appellant varied over the years, finding that PP began as a salaried employee and moved to a commissioned basis over the years. Ultimately, the motion judge held that there was an oral agreement between the parties wherein PP would work based on the promise to pay the appellant the agreed upon percentages once a file realized settlement or judgment proceeds. The motion judge held that since the entitlement to payment did not crystalize until the fees were billed and collected, PP was therefore entitled to all three categories of fees. Alternatively, the motion judge concluded that PP would nevertheless be entitled to compensation on a quantum meruit basis. The motion judge held that retaining the benefit of PP’s work to PP’s detriment would constitute unjust enrichment for which there was no juristic reason.
The motion judge dismissed the appellant’s claims for damages, concluding that PP did not breach any duties to the appellant. The motion judge concluded that PP’s assistance in finding a new office space amounted to nothing more than planning his departure. Moreover, the motion judge held that PP did nothing to induce the assistant and law clerk to leave and, in any event, that the appellant failed to prove it had suffered damages.
issues:
1. Did the motion judge err in their interpretation of the employment contract?
2. Did the motion judge err in finding unjust enrichment?
3. Did the motion judge err in finding that PP did not breach any duties to the appellant?
4. Did the motion judge err in finding that there was no evidence of damages suffered by the appellant?
holding:
Appeal allowed, in part.
reasoning:
1. Yes, for compensation for contributions made to files that were settled after PP’s departure. No, for files settled prior to PP’s departure.
The appellant argued that it was an error for the motion judge to conclude that there existed contractual entitlement to post-termination compensation. The appellant argued that since the parties never turned their minds to the issue and therefore never formed an agreement for post-termination payments, there was no entitlement to such payments. Any such obligation could only have arisen by contract, to which the appellant would never have agreed. The appellant further argued that there was no basis for the motion judge to infer such terms into the existing contract.
The motion judge relied on the holding in Dumbrell, which the motion judge understood to mean that when a contractual obligation to pay compensation exists at the time the contract is terminated, the obligations survive termination unless an express term provides otherwise. As a result, the motion judge concluded that the contextual factors supported PP’s entitlement to post-termination compensation. Those factors included the following: that the purpose of the agreement was to establish how PP would be compensated for work he did; the fact that PP’s compensation changed from straight salary under which there was no expectation of post-termination payment, to a commission structure; that the commission structure was one in which both parties assumed the risk that no revenue would be generated; the fact that a reasonable person would not expect that once a file was billed that PP would receive nothing simply for leaving the firm; and that absent any agreement to the contrary, a reasonable person would have expected to be paid post-departure for their share.
The appellant argued that the contextual factors outlined by the motion judge amounted to adopting a presumption in contractual interpretation that a contract for services presumes payment for all services unless the contract provides otherwise (which it does not). The appellant also argued that the contextual factors assumed a normative proposition of an agreement that a reasonable people should have made. The appellant highlighted that the motion judge’s interpretation of the contextual factors did not ascertain what the parties agreed to. The appellant further argued that because the contract did not address post-termination remuneration, the motion judge should have recognized that there was no meeting of the minds on that condition and, therefore, there was no entitlement to remuneration.
The Court commented that there are limits to techniques of textual interpretation where the contract to be interpreted is formed orally. The Court distinguished the Dumbrell case, holding that Dumbrell concerned the interpretation of a written contract. Instead, the Court found the case at bar to be analogous to the compensation of a commissioned salesperson. The Court relied on the Rowen case, that held that obligations to pay commissions to commissioned salespersons survives termination of employment for sales that were completed prior to termination. However, the Court concluded that the employment contract in the present case established an “agreement to the contrary” with respect to unbilled Work in Progress. The Court held that the contract contemplated situations where work would not be renumerated, such as when there was no recovery for clients. The Court concluded that just as a commissioned salesperson may receive no compensation for hours that do not result in a sale, PP would not receive compensation for hours worked that did not result in a finalized judgment while he was at the firm. Further, the Court held that PP failed to establish a widespread practice. Although PP argued that two lawyers who previously left the appellant firm were given credit for the work they performed on files, the Court held that this was entirely based on the discretion of the appellant and did not arise out of a contractual obligation. The Court was of the view that there was no contractual basis to compensate PP for his contributions to files settled after his departure, despite his efforts contributing to those settlements.
The Court concluded, however, that the motion judge made no error regarding PP’s entitlement to compensation for files settled before his departure, holding that Rowen applied.
2. Yes.
The Court disagreed with the motion judge and held that there was no claim for unjust enrichment. Quantum meruit does not apply to services that are within the scope of a contract when the contract establishes how services will be remunerated. In this case, the Court concluded that the contract encompassed PP’s unbilled Work in Progress, stating that the parties contemplated that the file would be brought to successful resolution before PP could earn his commission.
3. No.
The motion judge did not err in finding that PP did not breach his duty of good faith to the appellant. The motion judge’s decision was supported by evidence and therefore entitled to deference. PP maintained his billings and did nothing to undermine the appellant. The sole action PP took that furthered the interests of the new law firm was looking for new office space, which was merely preparation for the respondent’s departure, and the Court saw no error in this finding.
4. No.
Given that the Court was satisfied that the motion judge made no error in finding that the respondent did not breach a duty owed to the appellant, there was no basis for the appellant to claim damages.
Diep v. Mac’s Convenience Stores Inc., 2026 ONCA 424
Simmons, Paciocco and Osborne JJ.A.
Counsel:
D. Zarek and Y. Aziz for the appellants, 2117240 Ontario Ltd (COA-25-CV-0612)
C. K. Boggs and P. Cianfarani, for the appellants, V.C. Operating as Custom Snowplowing and Maintenance (COA-25-CV-0737)
A. M. Voudouris and T. Blomme, for the respondents, C.K.D., by his Litigation Guardian M.D., A.D., M.D., personally and M.D.
R. V. Bambers, T. Gindi and C. Holmes, for the respondent, Ontario Health Insurance Plan
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Occupier’s Liability, Slip and Fall, Damages, Contracts, Insurance, Automobile, Statutory Accident Benefits, Health Care Costs, Civil Procedure, Determination of Question of Law, Issue Estoppel, Abuse of Process, Occupiers Liability Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. O.2., Insurance Act R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8., Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, Insurance Act,R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8., Automobile Insurance Rate Stability Act, 1996 (Bill 59), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(a), El-Khodr v. Lackie, 2017 ONCA 716, Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care) v. Georgiou, 2002 CanLII 45036 (ON CA), Greenhalgh v. ING Halifax Insurance Co., 2004 CanLII 21045 (ON CA), Heredi v. Fensom, 2002 SCC 50, Hernandez v. 1206625 Ontario Inc., 2002 CanLII 45089 (ON CA), Davis v. Aviva General Insurance Co., 2024 ONSC 3054, Air Canada v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161, Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, Budd v. Paterson (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 715 (C.A.), Amos v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 405, Smith v. Co-Operators General Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 30, Tomec v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 882, Coban v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2026 ONSC 1925
facts:
The respondent, Mr. D, suffered serious injuries when he slipped and fell on ice or snow while getting into his car in a convenience store parking lot. The parking lot is owned by 2117240 Ontario Ltd (“211”) and maintained by Custom Snowplowing and Maintenance (“CSM”).
Mr. D applied to his car insurer for statutory accident benefits (“SABs”). He was found to be entitled to SABs after an assessment from the Licence Appeal Tribunal.
Mr. D sued the appellants in negligence and liability under the Occupiers Liability Act. Mr. D also made a claim for all amounts the Ontario Health Insurance Plan has a subrogated interest in.
The appellants each brought a motion seeking determinations that: i) any damages awarded against them must be reduced by the SABs Mr. D receives, and ii) the Health Insurance Act (“HIA”) precludes OHIP’s rights of subrogation.
The motion judge did not grant the orders the appellants requested. She determined that any damages awarded against the appellants should not be reduced by Mr. D’s SABs because his claim was not an action for loss or damage from bodily injury arising directly or indirectly from the use or operation of a car under the Insurance Act.
The motion judge also determined that OHIP’s subrogated claims were not precluded by the HIA because the lossed that OHIP claimed did not arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of a car. In the alternative, she found that neither of the appellants were insured under “a motor vehicle liability policy issued in Ontario” as required under the HIA.
issues:
1. Did the motion judge err by disregarding binding decisions of the Court which held that:
a. the purpose of s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act is to codify the common law principle that a plaintiff should not recover twice for the same kind of loss arising from the same incident in any related tort litigation (El-Khodr v. Lackie); and
b. the HIA requires factual determinations and are not concerned with the cause of action pleaded (Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care) v. Georgiou)?
2. Did the motion judge err by failing to consider all the purposes of s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act and by allowing Mr. D to receive double recovery?
3. Did the motion judge err by failing to hold that the doctrines of abuse of process and issue estoppel applied?
holding:
Appeal dismissed.
reasoning:
1. No. The motion judge did not err by disregarding binding decisions of the Court. These decisions were distinguishable from this case.
(a) El-Khodr was not a case involving a non-motor vehicle cause of the victim’s loss. Further, El-Khodr did not address the propositions that at common law there was an exemption from the rule against double recovery and that restrictions on a plaintiff’s right to advance his full claim should be narrowly construed.
(b) The issue raised in Georgiou was distinguishable from this case. Here, the dispute concerned whether Mr. D’s action for loss or damage from bodily injury or death arose directly or indirectly from the use or operation of a car. In Georgiou, this issue was not in dispute.
2. No. The motion judge did not err by failing to consider all purposes of s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act and by allowing Mr. D to receive double recovery.
The motion judge stated that s. 267.8 precluded double recovery where the damage or loss claimed in the case arose “directly or indirectly from the use or operation of the automobile.” The motion judge concluded that this restriction did not apply because Mr. D’s action against the appellant was not properly characterized as arising from the use or operation of an automobile. She found that the dominant cause of the action was the failure of the occupiers to remove ice and snow from the parking lot.
3. No. The motion judge did not err by failing to hold that the doctrines of abuse of process and issue estoppel applied.
Abuse of process did not apply because the context of the motion before the motion judge was “very different” from the context of the LAT proceedings. The questions before the motion judge were whether the Insurance Act deprived Mr. D of his right to full recovery in his action against the appellants and whether OHIP’s right of subrogation was precluded the HIA. The question before the LAT adjudicator was whether Mr. D was entitled to SABs.
Issue estoppel was not applicable because its requirements were not satisfied. Issue estoppel requires the issue to be the same as the one decided in the prior decision, for parties to both proceedings to be the same or their privies, and for the prior judicial decision to be final. The issue before the motion judge was not the same as the issue before the LAT adjudicator. Further, the parties to both proceedings were different and the appellants were not privy to Mr. D or his automobile insurer. Despite the LAT adjudicator’s decision being final, the requirements for issue estoppel were not met.
Mazzeo v. Mazzeo, 2026 ONCA 447
Madsen and Lene JJ.A.
Counsel:
M. J. Stangarone and N. Clyde, for the moving party
S.M., acting in person
C. Tempesta, for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer
Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Relocation, Child Abduction, Best Interests of the Child, Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35, RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 31, D.C. v T.B., 2021 ONCA 562, K.K. v. M.M., 2021 ONCA 407, Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16
facts:
The parties have one child together, S.M., who was born in California in June 2016. They separated in 2019. After separation, they shared parenting time and decision-making responsibility for S.M. In July 2020, the mother moved to Ontario. The parties consented to a final parenting order that provided for joint decision-making. In the event of a disagreement, the father had final decision-making authority on any educational or medical issue. The father also had “primary physical custody” or primary care of S.M. The final consent order also specified that S.M.’s primary residence was California. In contemplation of the mother’s move to Canada, the final consent order outlined the mother’s parenting time with S.M. both in California and in Canada.
S.M. travelled to Canada to visit her mother during the winter break in 2025. S.M. was scheduled to return to California in January 2026. The mother did not return S.M. Despite the father’s many requests, S.M. remains in Ontario. She has not attended school since her arrival in Ontario. The application judge ordered the immediate return of S.M. to California, as mandated by the Hague Convention.
issues:
Should the mother’s request for a stay of the return order pending the outcome of her appeal be granted?
holding:
Motion dismissed.
reasoning:
No. The test for a stay pending appeal is set out in RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311. It requires the court to consider:1) whether there is a serious question to be argued on appeal;
2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is refused; and
3) on a balance of convenience, which party would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of a stay.
1) The threshold to demonstrate a serious issue is low. S.M.’s strong objections to return and the import of this decision in her life are sufficient to meet the low threshold for a serious issue to be tried. The decision and order align with the purpose of the Hague Convention to protect children from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and return them to the jurisdiction most appropriate to determine parenting and decision-making disputes: Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, at para. 24. S.M.’s strong preference to live in Canada with her mother will be carefully considered by the California court. It is not a justification to disobey existing court orders, nor does it engage the high threshold of grave risk of harm or otherwise intolerable situation to justify a refusal of return under the Hague Convention.
2) The mother is in breach of the final consent order in California and in breach of the father’s custodial rights under California law. The mother’s legal entitlement to an appeal must be considered in the context of her own failure to obey court orders.
3) The Hague Convention is premised on the principle that returning a child to their habitual residence is in their best interests. There was no grave risk of serious harm to S.M. to prevent her return to her habitual residence.
Accordingly, the balance of convenience favoured refusing the stay.
James v HSBC Bank of Canada, 2026 ONCA 440
Miller, Trotter and Osborne JJ.A.
Counsel:
T. Miloš and O. Guinn, for the appellant
M. Evans and A. Basmadjian, for the respondents
Keywords:
Contracts, Banking, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Substantial Indemnity Costs, Proportionality, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 49.10, 57.01, Avedian v Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. (Enbridge Gas Distribution), 2021 ONCA 361, Doef v Hockey Canada et al., 2022 ONSC 1411, Clarington (Municipality) v Blue Circle Canada Inc., 2009 ONCA 722
facts:
The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing his action against the respondents and sought leave to appeal the costs order made against him in the amount of $225,000. The appellant, who was a practicing lawyer at the time, opened personal and commercial bank accounts, including a trust account, with the respondents. In May 2012, a bank employee detected suspicious large cash deposits into the appellant’s trust account. In June 2012, the appellant was charged with possession of the proceeds of crime, money laundering and fraud over $5,000. The respondents froze the appellant’s accounts, and the appellant’s personal accounts became subject to a restraint order under the Criminal Code. As these events were unfolding, the appellant had held options in Google Inc. and Priceline.com. The respondents advised the appellant to close these options by end of day on June 13, 2012. After the appellant failed to respond, the respondents sold the options on June 15, 2012, and generated a profit of $86,551 for the appellant.
The appellant was eventually acquitted of criminal charges, the restraint order was vacated and the respondents lifted the hold on the appellant’s accounts, allowing the appellant to access all remaining funds and any accrued interest.
The appellant commenced an action against the respondents and claimed damages for wrongful conversion of funds, intentional interference with economic relations, conspiracy and collusion, defamation and other causes of action, including a claim for funds allegedly withdrawn from the appellant’s account in Hong Kong.
Following discoveries in August 2018, the respondents advised of their intention to bring a summary judgement motion but took no steps at that time. The action was set down for trial in January 2023, but when the respondents served their summary judgment motion materials on February 1, 2024, no pre-trial conference or trial date was scheduled. The motion judge found that there was no genuine issue for trial, and there was no evidence that the respondents had accessed, transferred, controlled or held the appellants funds in Hong Kong.
The respondents sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $371, 885.64. The motion judge found that the $2 million claimed by the appellant was significant and included a punitive component. He also found that the appellant unnecessarily complicated the summary judgment motion by filing an affidavit that contradicted key admissions made during his examination for discovery. The motion judge emphasized the appellant’s refusal to accept a previous offer to settle and awarded costs of the summary judgment motion in the amount of $75,000 and of the underlying action in the amount of $150,000, both on a substantial indemnity scale.
issues:
(I) Did the motion judge err in granting summary judgment by failing to address the respondents’ delay in bringing their summary judgment motion and by misapprehending the evidence?
(II) Did the motion judge err in awarding costs on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $225,000?
holding:
Appeal allowed, in part.
reasoning:
(I) No. The motion judge did not err in granting summary judgment. The Court agreed that the motion judge should have addressed the issue of delay in his reasons, but it was clear from the record that this was an appropriate case for summary judgment. This was not a case in which the summary judgment procedure was weaponized to derail an upcoming trial. There was no trial date in sight when the motion was heard, and allowing this action to linger any longer with the possibility of going to trial would have resulted in the further waste of resources.
The motion judge’s reasons explained in detail why the case was appropriate for summary judgment and why the appellant was completely unsuccessful. The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the motion judge misapprehended the evidence, holding that he had made factual findings based on the appellant’s affidavit which declared that in 2019, the appellant learned that his funds had never left the Hong Kong bank.
(II) Yes. The motion judge did not err in awarding costs on a substantial indemnity basis, but the amount awarded was excessive in all of the circumstances. To achieve proportionality, the costs award of the underlying action was reduced from $150,000 to $100,000, for a total costs award of $175,000, all inclusive.
Simmons, Miller and Wilson JJ.A.
Counsel:
S. Pereira and W. West, for the appellant
K. Bonn and R. Patten, for the respondent
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, MVA, Permanent Serious Impairment, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, ss. 4, 5, Sched. B, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 267.5, Sanei v. Debarros, 2024 ONCA 104, Everding v. Skrijel, 2010 ONCA 437, Fennell v. Deol, 2016 ONCA 249, Peixeiro v. Haberman, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 549
facts:
J.L. was injured in a motor vehicle accident that occurred in November 2015. The vehicle that she was a passenger in was struck by W.B., causing her to hit her head and suffer a concussion. At the time, she was recovering from a previous concussion sustained during a workplace accident in April 2015. Having largely recovered from this first concussion, she was scheduled to return to work two days after the November accident. However, the second concussion resulting from the motor vehicle accident postponed this return date. Medical records from the years following the accident indicated that J.L. reported continuously of physical and cognitive problems which affected her on a daily basis. She returned to work in January 2016, on reduced hours and performing modified duties. She never returned to full-time regular duties.
In November 2021, J.L. issued a statement of claim against W.B. seeking damages for injuries sustained in the 2015 motor vehicle accident. W.B. defended the action and pleaded that it was statute-barred. The claim moved forward to examinations for discovery, following which W.B. brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claim was brought outside of the limitation period and should be dismissed. The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that it wasn’t until July 2020 – when J.L. met with a neuropsychologist to discuss his report from July 2018 – that J.L. knew that she had suffered an injury that would meet the “permanent serious impairment” threshold under the Insurance Act. Her claim was therefore commenced within the two-year limitation period.
issues:
Did the motion judge err in in failing to consider whether J.L. ought to have been aware that her injuries met the threshold prior to July 2020?
holding:
Appeal allowed.
reasoning:
Yes. The limitation period in an action for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident starts to run when the claimant knows, or reasonably ought to have known, that their injuries exceed the statutory deductible and the threshold of serious and permanent injury. The law is settled that a plaintiff need not know the full extent of the injuries suffered in order for the limitation period to start to run. A plaintiff need not be certain of success on a claim; the threshold is not that high. The claim was issued in November 2021, almost six years after the accident. Given the persistence of her significant symptoms and having been counselled in December 2016 that she may never reach “100% or [her] previous baseline”, J.L. was obligated to make inquiries about her rights. J.L.’s family doctors and other specialists had offered medical opinions not dissimilar from that of the neuropsychologist, beginning in 2016. Her claim was discoverable more than two years before it was commenced. The body of evidence sufficient to trigger the limitation period was available to J.L. at a much earlier date had she acted with due diligence.
Singh v Persaud, 2026 ONCA 435
Miller, Trotter and Osborne JJ.A.
Counsel:
G. Dingwall, for the appellant
H.K. Juriansz and M. Stoiko, for the respondent
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Property Law, Contracts, Interpretation, Trusts, Ownership, Intent, Transfer of Title, Statutory Declaration, Acknowledgement of Trust, ex turpi causa, Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Sattva Capital Corp. v Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, R v Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, Seelster Farms et al v Her Majesty the Queen and OLG, 2020 ONSC 4013, Upper Canada v Guardian Insurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 21, Waxman v Waxman (2004), 186 OAC 201 (CA), Scott v Golden Oaks Enterprises Inc., 2024 SCC 32, R v GF, 2021 SCC 20
facts:
The appellant appealed a judgment by which the trial judge ordered that the appellant transfer title to a property to the respondent, declared that the respondent was the sole beneficial owner of the property and dismissed the appellant’s counterclaim.
The respondent was the niece of the appellant. The family was originally from Guyana. The respondent brought money from Guyana when she came to Canada, including $38,000 from her ex-boyfriend, as well as an additional $11,000 and US$2,000 in cash. The property at 19 Jacob Fisher Drive, Toronto, was purchased in July 2007. The respondent gave the appellant $10,000 in cash towards the deposit. The appellant purchased the house in her name. A Statutory Declaration and Acknowledgement of Trust, both prepared by the appellant’s lawyer, were signed on August 7, 2007. The Acknowledgement stated that although property was registered in the appellant’s name as owner, she held title for the respondent. The Statutory Declaration stated that the respondent was the sole beneficial owner of the property. After the purchase, the respondent paid all carrying costs for the home in cash each month as instructed by the appellant.
The relationship between the appellant and the respondent deteriorated in 2016. By June 2016, the respondent had arranged a mortgage with RBC for the property and brought an action seeking an order directing the appellant to transfer title to the property into her name as sole beneficial owner.
The appellant brought a counterclaim alleging that she was the beneficial owner while also seeking rescission of the Statutory Declaration and Acknowledgement of Trust, unjust enrichment, and general damages for aggravation, stress and anxiety, among other relief. The trial judge ordered the appellant to transfer title to the respondent, found that the respondent was the sole beneficial owner of the property, awarded general damages of $26,084.37 and punitive damages of $10,000, and dismissed the appellant’s counterclaim.
issues:
Whether the trial judge erred in:
(i) awarding the respondent punitive damages of $10,000 when punitive damages were not pleaded in the statement of claim, and were also formally abandoned by counsel during trial;
(ii) providing insufficient reasons for her decision;
(iii) failing to appreciate or grapple with issues raised in the evidence relating to the Acknowledgement of Trust and Statutory Declaration, and in particular made reviewable errors in her findings related to:
a. the effect of an exculpatory clause;
b. an alleged one-year term to the trust arrangement;
c. the alleged unenforceability of the trust agreement on the basis of illegality or ex turpi causa; and
(iv) failing to address credibility issues relating to the evidence of the two parties.
holding:
Appeal dismissed.
reasoning:
(i) Did the trial judge err in awarding punitive damages of $10,000 when punitive damages were not pleaded and were formally abandoned by counsel during trial?
No. Punitive damages were expressly claimed in the amended Statement of Claim. The appellant was clearly on notice that they were being sought and specifically pleaded to the claim in her amended statement of defence. With respect to the alleged concession during trial that the claim for punitive damages was abandoned, the Court found that a fair reading of the exchange in the tran between counsel for the respondent and the trial judge reflected that the subject-matter of the exchange was the extent of special damages being claimed, and nothing more.
Further, the respondent expressly sought punitive damages in the amount of $10,000 in written submissions at the conclusion of trial. The trial judge awarded punitive damages based on her findings that the actions of the appellant were high-handed and of a nature that merited sanction, including failure to notify about realty taxes, failure to renew the mortgage on favourable terms, failure to renew insurance from 2018 to 2024, and failure to reveal insurance files related to a flood damage claim. All of those findings were open to the trial judge on record. The Court saw no basis to interfere with the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion to award punitive damages in the amount of $10,000.
(ii) Did the trial judge provide insufficient reasons for her decision?
No. The Court found that the reasons for the decision clearly explained the basis for the decision reached by the trial judge and allowed for meaningful appellate review.
(iii) Did the trial judge fail to appreciate or grapple with issues raised in the evidence relating to the Acknowledgement of Trust and Statutory Declaration, and in particular made reviewable errors in her findings related to:
a. The effect of an exculpatory clause?
No. The key findings were not based on credibility, but rather on the contemporaneous documentary evidence and in particular, the plain language of the Statutory Declaration and Acknowledgement of Trust. The Court acknowledged that when interpreting a contract, the court should follow a practical, common-sense approach focused on the contractual intent of the parties. The so-called exculpatory clause could not be read as an agreement between the parties that the appellant could simply ignore the Acknowledgement of Trust and take beneficial ownership of the property for herself while barring any claim by the respondent. The Court held that such an interpretation would lead to an absurd result.
b. An alleged one-year term to the trust arrangement?
No. The trial judge addressed the one-year issue, noting that the property was to be rented out during the first year after which the house was to be transferred, if possible, given the respondent’s finances, into the respondent’s name. The Court found that reasons are not insufficient merely because they do not refer to every document or every provision in every document that was in the record before the trial judge. The absence of a reference to a specific piece of evidence suggests not that the trial judge ignored evidence, but that she did not regard that evidence as significant. The submission that the failure by the respondent to pay out the mortgage in one year ought to result in the forfeiture of any beneficial interest in the property was rejected for the same reasons set out in respect to the exculpatory provision.
c. The alleged unenforceability of the Trust Agreement on the basis of illegality or ex turpi causa?
No. The trial judge fully considered the submissions and evidence and expressly rejected the appellant’s allegations. The trial judge found that at the time of the purchase of the home in 2007, the respondent had only recently learned that the funds she had brought from Guyana were being released to her by her ex-boyfriend and that she did not have to return them. The trial judge further found that the doctrine of ex turpi causa did not render the trust agreement illegal and unenforceable because the parties entered into a simple agreement whereby the appellant would hold title to the property in trust for the respondent. This agreement was not illegal per se, nor was there any evidence that the parties entered into the agreement with the object of committing an illegal act.
(iv) Did the trial judge fail to address credibility issues relating to the evidence of the two parties?
No. The Court found that the reasons clearly set out the findings of the trial judge with respect to the credibility and reliability of the appellant and respondent. The trial judge found the respondent to be a credible witness and her evidence to be credible, while she rejected the evidence of the appellant as being inconsistent both internally and against the documentary evidence, as well as generally problematic. The Court noted that a trial judge’s findings of credibility deserve particular deference.
Bridging Finance Inc. v. Sharpe,, 2026 ONCA 432
Miller, Thorburn, and Pomerance JJ.A.
Counsel:
K. Theeuwen, L. Boritz, and H. Sohail, for the appellant
S. McGrath and E. Pleet, G. Hunnisett and A. Gupta, for the respondents
Keywords: Contracts, Trusts, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Torts, Fraud, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Forum Non conveniens, Notices of Motion, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 37.01, 2249659 Ontario Ltd. v. Sparkasse Siegen, 2013 ONCA 354, Haaretz.com v. Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28, Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melancon LLP v. Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2016 SCC 30, Kyko Global Inc. v. M/S Crawford Bayley & Co., 2021 ONCA 736, Sinclair v. Venezia Turismo, 2025 SCC 7, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, 2183164 Ontario Inc. v. Gillani, 2013 ONSC 1456, Laxton v. Anstalt, 2011 BCCA 212
facts:
DS and NS are former principals of the respondent company, BFI. DS and NS were accused of falsely representing BFI to be a legitimate investment and loan company while also funneling BFI’s funds to an offshore trust, to which DS, NS and their son were all beneficiaries. As a result, various actions were brought against DS, NS and the other defendants, including the company that acted as the Trustee. One action was commenced by the Receiver of all the plaintiffs, including BFI. The second action was commenced by another plaintiff, an investment company. Both sets of plaintiffs sought damages against the defendants.
The Trustee brought companion motions to stay or dismiss both actions on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction, or in the alternative, that Ontario was forum non conveniens. The Trustee further argued the sufficiency of pleadings in both actions. The motion judge rejected the Trustee’s arguments and concluded that the pleadings were adequate for the jurisdictional motions, that there were various connecting factors linking the disputes to Ontario, and the presumption of jurisdiction was not rebutted by the Trustee. Ontario’s jurisdiction simpliciter was established over the dispute. Finally, the motion judge concluded that Ontario was the most appropriate and convenient jurisdiction for both actions and was therefore not forum non conveniens.
issues:
1. Did the motion judge err in their pleading analysis?
2. Did the motion judge err in finding that the contract relating to the dispute was made in Ontario?
3. Did the motion judge err in finding that the Trustee committed a tort in Ontario?
4. Did the motion judge err in concluding that the Trustee failed to rebut the presumptive factors?
holding:
Appeal dismissed.
reasoning:
The Court began with the standard of review. The test for jurisdiction simpliciter is a question of mixed fact and law, reviewable for palpable and overriding error, unless an error in the application of the test can be attributed to an extricable question of law. The question of whether a contract is formed is a question of law reviewable on a correctness standard.
1. No. The motion judge did not err in rejecting the Trustee’s argument that the claims were pleaded so inadequately that they disclosed no cause of action capable of supporting a jurisdictional analysis. The Court agreed with the motion judge that the notices of motion were intended to give the opposing party notice of the issues to be addressed, and that the Trustee had not identified the insufficiency of the pleadings as an issue. The pleadings were readily understandable and contained sufficient detail for the purposes of a jurisdiction motion.
2. No. To jurisdiction simpliciter, there must be a real and substantial connection between the circumstances giving rise to the claim and the forum in which it is brought. There are four presumptive factors:
1) the defendant is domiciled or resident in the province;
2) the defendant carries on business in the province;
3) the tort was committed in the province; and
4) the contract connected with the dispute was made in the province.
The plaintiff is required to establish one or more of these factors to establish a presumption that the claim is properly within its jurisdiction. In such cases, the onus will then shift to the defendant to rebut the presumption by establishing that the factor does not point to a real relationship between the dispute and the forum.
The motion judge correctly concluded that the contacts in question were concluded in Ontario. With respect to the Trust Deed, the Trustee argued that it could not ground jurisdiction because BFI was not a party to the deed, which was executed by only the Trustee, DS and NS. However, the Court concluded that the motion judge correctly rejected this argument, holding that the defendant’s liability did not need to flow directly from the contractual relationship. It was sufficient that the defendant’s conduct brought it within the scope of the contractual relationship, and that the events that gave rise to the claim flowed from the relationship created by the contract. The Court also rejected the Trustee’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to link the Trust Deed to Ontario. When the contracting parties are in different jurisdictions, the contact will be formed in the jurisdiction where the last essential act of contract formation was performed. In this case, the preparation of the Trust Deed by the Trustee served as the Trustee’s acceptance. DS and NS subsequently accepted when they signed the document in Ontario. This was the last act of contract formation. It was not disputed that DS and NS ever travelled to the location of the offshore trust or that the document was ever outside of Ontario. The motion judge also correctly determined that while the Trust Deed was transmitted offshore electronically, there was no evidence to establish that the acceptance was transmitted instantaneously to amount to the contract being received offshore.
In terms of the Loan Contract, the Court concluded that it could clearly be inferred that it was concluded in Ontario. Although the address of the witness in the Deed of Gift and Transfer was blacked out, it was not necessary to determine if they were concluded in Ontario, given that the other two contracts have been established to be concluded in Ontario.
3. No. There was little doubt that the tort was not committed in Ontario. Fraud is committed in the place from which the money was wrongfully taken, not the place to which it is taken. A plaintiff should not be required to commence multiple separate proceedings in foreign jurisdictions due to the tortfeasor wrongly taking money outside of Canada. Accordingly, although the funds were sent offshore, they were taken in Ontario, therefore the tort was committed in Ontario.
4. No. The Trustee relied on Sinclair, wherein the jurisdiction over each defendant must be considered separately in cases where there are multiple defendants. Such a requirement does not bar the jurisdiction simpliciter analysis. The Trustee was a party to the Trust Deed, which the motion judge correctly determined was concluded in Ontario. The motion judge also noted that while DS and NS committed the tort at first instance, the Trustee was implicated in the tortious conduct by agreeing to receive the funds and sharing them into a foreign trust without making proper inquires into their source. The Trustee’s offshore status was only one factor in the analysis and did not defeat the impact of the other presumptive connecting factors. The Trustee argued that the Trust Deed was far removed from the broader dispute between DS, NS and BFI. The Trustee argued that the connection between the Trust Deed and the dispute only arose in the aftermath of the torts committed by DS and NS. The Trustee went on to further argue that while there may be a connection between the Trustee, the dispute and the torts allegedly committed by DS and NS, there was no real and substantial connection for the purpose of jurisdiction. The Court rejected these arguments, finding that the Trustee knew or ought to have known the source of the funds and accepted them anyways, thus assisting DS and NS in breaching their fiduciary duty, or knowingly or reckless receiving funds from DS and NS that did not belong in the Trust. The Court distinguished the present case from Sinclair. It concluded that there was in fact a sufficient connection between the dispute and Ontario. Firstly, the Trustee was a party to the Trust Deed, which was the instrument used to shelter the proceeds of the alleged fraud. Moreover, the Trustee knew the settlers and beneficiaries of the Trust were in Ontario, they knew the settlers were founders of a large Ontario-based investment fund and they turned their mind to identifying the source of these funds. These factors established the nexus between the dispute and Ontario and informed the reasonable expectation of the trustee.
Block Developments Inc. v. Brewers Retail Inc., 2026 ONCA 431
Simmons, Zarnett and Sossin JJ.A.
Counsel:
J. Galway, C. DiMatteo, and S. Rajayer, for the appellant
M. Sammon, C. Yung, and K. Dods, for the respondent
Keywords:
Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Damages, Defences, Mitigation, The Rosseau Group Inc. v. 2528061 Ontario Inc., 2023 ONCA 814, Southcott Estates Inc. v. Toronto Catholic District School Board, 2012 SCC 51, Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., 2002 SCC 19, Naylor Group Inc. v. Ellis-Don Construction Ltd., 2001 SCC 58, Rougemount Capital Inc. v. Computer Associates International Inc., 2016 ONCA 847, TMS Lighting Ltd. v. KJS Transport Inc., 2014 ONCA 1, SFC Litigation Trust v. Chan, 2019 ONCA 525, 100 Main Street Ltd. v. W.B. Sullivan Construction Ltd. (1978), 1978 CanLII 1630 (ON CA), 642947 Ontario Ltd. v. Fleischer, 2001 CanLII 8623 (ON CA), Remington Development Corporation v. Canadian Pacific Railway Company, 2025 ABCA 244, Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass, 2000 SCC 52, St. John’s (City) v. Lynch, 2024 SCC 17, Asamera Oil Corp. v. Sea Oil and General Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633, Akelius Canada Ltd. v. 2436196 Ontario Inc., 2022 ONCA 259, Kinbauri Gold Corp. v. Iamgold International African Mining Gold Corp., 2004 CanLII 36051 (ON CA), Gholami v. The Hospital for Sick Children, 2018 ONCA 783, British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., 2004 SCC 38, Scott v. Forjani, 2021 ONSC 1996, 345176 Canada Inc. et al. v. James Selkirk Custom Homes Ltd, 2026 ONSC 600, Medway v. Manitoba (Department of Urban Affairs) (1983), 29 L.C.R. 89, 1427814 Ontario Limited v. 3697584 Canada Inc., 2012 ONSC 156, Northern Meat Packers Ltd. v. Roynat Ltd., 1986 CanLII 135 (NB CA), BCE Place Limited v. Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, 2010 ONCA 672, British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd., [1912] A.C. 673 (H.L.)
facts:
In June 2015, Block Developments Inc. (“Block”) entered into two agreements of purchase and sale (“APS”) to acquire properties owned by Brewers Retail Inc. (“Brewers”) at 1200 Dundas St. W. (the “Dundas Property”) and 28 River St. (the “River Property”) in Toronto. The properties had been marketed by Brewers as excellent development opportunities, and Block intended to develop them by constructing a mixed-use condominium project, with a portion of the redeveloped project to be leased back to Brewers. Block was part of a corporate group pursuing aggressive growth with substantial financial backing. Block agreed to purchase the Dundas Property for $6.9 million and the River Property for $4.9 million, with closing scheduled for December 15, 2015. Each APS contained conditions, including a Buyer’s Diligence Condition and a Mutual Lease Condition. The parties subsequently agreed to price reductions ($6.15 million for the Dundas Property and $4.15 million for the River Property), and Block waived the Buyer’s Diligence Condition.
The trial judge found that on October 29, 2015, Brewers’ Director of Real Estate, Tom Lucas, made misrepresentations to Block that led it not to waive the Mutual Lease Condition. Prior to October 29, Lucas had approached Rosewater Development (“Rosewater”), whose principal was a friend and business associate of Lucas, and obtained instructions from Brewers’ Board to sell the properties to Rosewater based on what the trial judge found were “numerous significant misrepresentations.” On November 5, 2015, Brewers terminated each APS, relying on the alleged non-fulfillment of the Mutual Lease Condition. Brewers then sold the properties to Rosewater for $9.95 million total ($5.45 million for the Dundas Property and $4.5 million for the River Property), which was $350,000 less than Block had agreed to pay, closing on December 15, 2015.
Block sued for damages. The trial judge found that Brewers acted egregiously, breaching its contractual obligations and its duty of good faith and fair dealing, and making actionable misrepresentations. The trial judge awarded damages in the amount of $15.5 million plus prejudgment interest based on a lost development profits approach endorsed by both parties’ experts. Brewers did not contest the liability findings on appeal but challenged the measure of damages and the trial judge’s mitigation analysis.
issues:
1. Did the trial judge use an erroneous and unjustified measure of damages?
2. Did the trial judge err by concluding that Block’s damages should not be reduced due to mitigation?
holding:
Appeal dismissed.
reasoning:
1. No. The normal measure of damages for a failed real estate purchase is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the land on the assessment date, which is usually the date of breach. This was reaffirmed in Rosseau Group. However, the normal measure may be departed from where it does not address the type of loss the innocent party actually suffered.
The Court rejected Brewers’ argument that the Rosewater sale price must be treated as market value. Market value posits a hypothetical transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties, and a single actual transaction is only one data point. The Rosewater sale was tainted by Lucas’ conduct in terminating the APS with Block to benefit his friend and business associate. Neither party’s economic damages expert treated the Rosewater sale price as determinative of what a reasonable party would pay.
The Court also rejected Brewers’ argument that the trial judge’s approach replicated the error identified in Rosseau Group. The approaches differed in four important ways. First, damages were calculated using the assessment date contemplated by the normal measure, namely the date of breach. Second, the calculation accounted for the time to realize cash flows and the risks in achieving them through a discount rate. Third, the discount rate was derived by asking what a reasonable party would pay or accept at a given point in time in exchange for a future stream of cash flows, based on the risk of achieving those cash flows and the time value of money. Fourth, the approach was the same one taken by Brewers’ own experts.
The development opportunity had a significant degree of specificity known to the parties at the time of contracting. Brewers marketed the properties as development opportunities, both parties contemplated a mixed-use condominium, and each APS required a portion of the redeveloped sites be leased back to Brewers. It was therefore open to the trial judge to accept the lost development profits approach as the fair and appropriate means to assess damages in the circumstances.
2. No. After each APS was terminated, Block’s affiliates purchased several other development properties. At trial, both parties treated Block and its affiliates as a single entity for the purposes of mitigation. Brewers argued that Block had fully mitigated its damages through those purchases, while Block argued it would have made those purchases regardless. The trial judge found that Block could and would have purchased each of those properties in addition to the Properties it was to acquire from Brewers, and thus no mitigation occurred.
On appeal, Brewers argued for the first time that the trial judge erred by conflating Block with its corporate affiliates and that Southcott required a finding that Block failed to mitigate. The Court rejected this argument for two reasons.
First, the trial judge did not commit a reversible error by addressing mitigation on the premise the parties themselves advanced at trial, namely that Block and its affiliates should be treated as one.
Second, Brewers failed to demonstrate a causal link between its breach and Block’s ability to mitigate. A plaintiff only has a duty to mitigate losses that are consequent on the breach. In Southcott, the plaintiff was a special purpose vehicle with limited capital that made a strategic decision not to acquire replacement properties. Here, by contrast, the trial judge accepted that Block had substantial backing and no operational or financial constraints. Brewers’ breach did not change Block’s financial position or impact decision-making across its corporate group. The six properties purchased post-breach were independent transactions that Block would have acquired regardless and therefore could not constitute mitigation.
Brown v. Meaney, 2026 ONCA 445
Copeland, Wilson & Pomerance JJ.A.
Counsel:
D. Cruz, M. Watkins, and S. Rogers, for the appellants
P. Harte, J. Harte, and K. Bonn, for the respondents
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, MedMal, Standard of Care, Informed Consent, Causation, “But For” Test, Sylvester v. Crits et al., 1956 CanLII 34 (ON CA), ter Neuzen v. Korn, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674, Flood v. Boutette, 2021 ONCA 515, Denman v. Radovanovic, 2024 ONCA 276, Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119, Van Dyke v. Grey Bruce Regional Health Centre, (2005), 255 D.L.R. (4th) 397 (Ont. C.A.), Hopp v. Lepp, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 192, Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, Cheung v. Samra, 2022 ONCA 195, Welton v. United Lands Corporation Limited, 2020 ONCA 322
facts:
Ms. B was born with a rare seizure disorder. At three months old, she experienced seizures and was brought to a local hospital. She was transferred to McMaster Children’s Hospital (“MCH”) and admitted to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit. She came under the care of the appellants, Dr. M and Dr. R, who were pediatric neurologists.
The disorder was rare but known and caused by an inability to metabolize vitamin B6. Ms. B’s case was atypical as the onset of the disorder was months after birth. At the time, if an infant did not respond to anti-seizure medication, the disorder would be considered as a possible diagnosis. The diagnostic process involved an empirical trial in three phases: the challenge phase, the withdrawal phase and the rechallenge phase.
When Ms. B was admitted, she was prescribed an anti-seizure medication and was intubated. After intubation, the seizures stopped. Dr. M ordered an empirical trial and began the challenge phase by administering vitamin B6. Dr. R then assumed care of Ms. B and began the withdrawal phase. Dr. M resumed care and concluded that the anti-seizure medication was effective and ruled out the disorder.
Ms. B continued to experience seizures. Anti-seizure medications appeared to be effective. When re-admitted to MCH and under the care of Dr. M and Dr. M, anti-seizure medications were prescribed but were not effective. The appellants did not consider reintroducing vitamin B6. She was placed in a drug induced coma because her seizures could not be controlled. After 10 days in hospital, Ms. B was given vitamin B6, stopping her seizures.
Years later, genetic testing was developed and confirmed Ms. B’s disorder.
Prior to the continued seizures, Ms. B was developing well. After her re-admittance to MCH, her brain growth slowed, and her disposition changed. An MRI revealed she had suffered brain damage.
At the time of trial, Ms. B was non-verbal and could understand and follow only very simple directions. She required assistance with all activities of daily living.
In the claim, the respondents alleged that the appellants were negligent in their treatment of Ms. B and that, as a result, she suffered severe neurological injuries and resultant intellectual and developmental delay. The appellants denied any negligence in their provision of care.
The action proceeded to trial on the issues of liability, causation and damages. The trial judge rendered a judgment for the respondents, finding that the appellants were negligent and that their negligence caused Ms. B’s injuries.
issues:
1. Did the trial judge err by creating his own standard of care?
2. Did the trial judge err in his treatment of the issue of informed consent?
3. Did the trial judge err in his analysis of causation?
holding:
Appeal dismissed.
reasoning:
1. No. The trial judge did not err in his assessment of the standard of care. Further, he did not create his own standard of care. The trial judge found the appellants’ unreasonable conclusion in all the circumstances to be more than merely a wrong judgement call.
In an action for medical negligence, the claimant must prove what the standard of care was at the time of the events, that the defendant professional breached that standard of care, and that the breach caused some damage. The standard of care for a medical practitioner is that of a reasonably prudent practitioner with the same level of experience and in similar circumstances. For specialists, like the appellants, the standard of care is that of reasonably prudent specialist in the same field. The standard is not one of perfection, nor even excellence.
In negligence cases involving professionals, expert evidence is generally required to establish the standard of care, as it is beyond the knowledge of the average person. This standard of care was articulated by the experts at trial. Based on expert testimony, the trial judge concluded that the appellants had breached the standard of care when they concluded that the vitamin B6 treatments were not effective only a few days post-withdrawal. It was unreasonable for the appellants to have disregarded the possibility of the disorder after a short observation period and without fulfilling the last step of the diagnostic process, especially considering the atypical nature of Ms. B’s disorder.
2. No. The trial judge did not err in his treatment of informed consent.
The duty to obtain informed consent requires physicians to disclose the nature of a proposed treatment, any associated material risks and benefits, and alternatives, so the patient can make an informed choice. The materiality of risk is determined on an objective basis: whether a reasonable person in the patient’s position would want to know of the risk. The extent to which a doctor is required to disclose alternative options for treatment depends on factual circumstances. A doctor does not avoid liability for a breach of the duty to obtain informed consent simply through a lack of knowledge. Physicians are required to disclose risks, benefits, and alternatives that are “known or which should be known” to them.
The appellants contended that this was not an informed consent case. This argument was rejected. Liability can be both a negligent failure to diagnose or treat the plaintiff and a breach of the duty to obtain informed consent.
The appellants submitted that the trial judge erred in failing to evaluate the materiality of the possibility that Ms. B’s condition could be treated with vitamin B6. The trial judge found that the appellants failed to discuss the diagnostic process with Ms. B’s parents, updates on her condition while on vitamin B6, and associated potential risks and benefits. As the trial judge found, any reasonable person in the position of Ms. B’s parents would want to know this information.
3. No. The trial judge did not err in his analysis of causation. Taking a commonsense approach to causation, the trial judge was entitled to conclude that causation had been made out: that but for the appellants’ negligence, Ms. B likely would not have sustained the brain injury and likely would not have suffered from resultant developmental delay.
Causation does not need to be determined by scientific precision. A trier of fact does not need to make a firm conclusion regarding the precise mechanism of injury. The respondents’ burden was to show that, on a commonsense basis, but for the appellants’ negligence, Ms. B’s injuries would not have occurred. The trial judge determined this burden was satisfied.
Evidence regarding Ms. B’s development, brain growth and injury, and medical records demonstrating the appellants knew about the possibility of permanent brain damage, all demonstrated causation. Further, Ms. B’s sister, who has the same disorder but received prompt treatment and did not suffer brain injury or the same developmental delays, demonstrated what might have occurred “but for” the appellants’ actions.
SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS
Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Readymix Foods Corporation, 2026 ONCA 423
Thorburn, Madsen, Rahman JJ.A.
Counsel:
E. Karp, for the appellant
N. Marconi, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Guarantees, Consideration, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, TD Canada Trust v. B & B Enterprises (London) Ltd., 2008 ONCA 441, Villeneuve v. Turner, [1990] O.J. No. 385 (Dis. Ct.)
T.C.O. Agromart Ltd. v. Sutton Farms (Nacona) Ltd., 2026 ONCA 437
Gillese, Coroza, Osborne JJ.A.
Counsel:
A. Rachlin and T. Kasi, for the appellant
S. Baldwin, for the respondent
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Costs, T.C.O. Agromart Ltd. v. Sutton Farms (Nacona) Ltd., 2026 ONCA 371
Rosehaven Homes Limited v. Jamil, 2026 ONCA 446
Tulloch, Rouleau and Lauwers, JJ.A.
Counsel:
N. Wilson, for the appellant
S. Jamil, acting in person
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Damages, Arista Homes v. Rahnama, 2022 ONCA 759, 642947 Ontario Ltd. v. Fleischer (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.),100 Main Street Ltd. v. W.B. Sullivan Construction Ltd. (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 401 (C.A.), Marshall v. Meirik, 2021 ONSC 1687, Marshall v. Meirik, 2022 ONCA 275
M.M. v. Children’s Aid Society of Toronto , 2026 ONCA 442
Paciocco, Sossin and Wilson JJ.A.
Counsel:
M.M., appearing in person
M. Pacheco, for the respondent
J. Tremain and P. Senson, for the respondent
C.L., appearing in person
Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Child Protection, Crown Wardship, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Fresh Evidence, Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s 2
Johnson v. Johnson, 2026 ONCA 448
Sossin, Monahan and Wilson JJ.A.
Counsel:
B. Johnson, acting in person
E.K. Johnson, acting in person
S. Hines, appearing as agent for E.K. Johnson
Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Dismissal for Delay, Evidence, Trans, Case Management, Reviews, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 7(5), Rules of Civil Procedure, r 61.13(1)(a), Johnson v. Johnson, 2026 ONCA 189
H.E-S. v. Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region , 2026 ONCA 443
Sossin, Monahan and Wilson JJ.A.
Counsel:
H.E-S., acting in person
M. Scull and P. Heinen, for the moving party
A. Reitboeck, for the respondent
Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Child Protection, Crown Wardship, Child Youth and Family Services Act, S.O. 2017, c. C14, s 102, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss 19(1), (a.1)
Bank of Montreal v. Khello, 2026 ONCA 441
Trotter, Paciocco and Wilson JJ.A.
Counsel:
A. Fox, for the appellant
No one appearing for the respondent
Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Orders, Final or Interlocutory
Avida 2015 Inc. (Re), 2026 ONCA 426
Huscroft, Dawe and Wilson JJ.A.
Counsel:
David T. Ullmann and Nadav Amar, for the appellant
C. Staples, for the respondent
P. Corney, for the trustee
Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Property of the Bankrupt, Choses in Action, Liquidation, Credit Bids, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s 193, Business Development Bank of Canada v. Pine Tree Resorts Inc., 2013 ONCA 282.
Winning v. 2483852 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 452
Paciocco, Sossin and Wilson, JJ.A.
Counsel:
A. Hora, for the appellant
J. Huang-Kung, for the respondents
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Conditions Precedent
Peninsula Employment Services Ltd v. Castillo, 2026 ONCA 450
Paciocco, Sossin and Wilson, JJ.A.
Counsel:
B. Hughes, for the appellant
H. Bruckner and R. Shah, for the respondents
Keywords: Contracts, Settlements, Civil Procedure, Disclosure, Abuse of Process, 1086289 Ontario Inc. (Urban Electrical Contractors) v. Welland (City), 2026 ONCA 352, Handley Estate v. DTE Industries Limited, 2018 ONCA 324
Berentschot v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 444
Paciocco, Sossin and Wilson, JJ.A.
Counsel:
S. Badawi, for the respondents
E. Bisbee, for the respondent
Keywords: Constitutional Law, International Law, Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigation, Abuse of Process, Frivolous, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Contraventions Act, S.C. 1992, c. 47, Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 17, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43., Rules of Civil Procedure, r 2.1.01, Fabrikant v. Kelly, 2023 ONCA 579, Ahmed v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 ONCA 427, Joshi v. Ontario, 2019 ONSC 2444, Poorkid Investments Inc. v. Ontario (Solicitor General), 2023 ONCA 172, Guindon v. Canada, 2015 SCC 41
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