Congratulations to Blaneys’ very own Eric Golden and Summer Xia for the result they obtained in Hermina Developments Inc. v. Epireon Capital Limited. The Court dismissed a motion by the debtor whose only asset was the farmland in question to stay an order permitting the sale of that land by a mortgagee pending an appeal from that sale order. The Court found no irreparable harm, no unique characteristics of the property, and held that if the appellant is successful on appeal, any losses could be remedied by an award of damages. The balance of convenience also favored the respondent mortgagee.
The Court also dismissed a motion to stay an order permitting the sale of farmland pending an appeal in Stewart Estate v. Stewart. The order in that case authorized an estate trustee to sell farmland to pay outstanding debts owed to CRA. The motion had been brought by the beneficiaries under a will.
A majority of the Court in Purolator Inc. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers dismissed a motion by Purolator to quash CUPW’s appeal from an order enjoining it from conducting secondary picketing at a Purolator facility. The motion judge found that s. 102 of the Courts of Justice Act did not apply to the motion and granted the injunction under s. 101. Section 102 applies to injunctions in “labour disputes”. The Court found s. 102 clearly applied, and that the judge erred in finding it did not. The appeal was therefore from an order under s. 102, and therefore there was an appeal under that section as of right to the Court, and no leave was required to appeal to the Divisional Court. In dissent, Gomery J. was of the view that the issue of whether the motion judge erred in finding that s. 102 did not apply was for the court hearing the appeal, not the Court on this motion to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Since the injunction was only granted under s. 101 (the motion judge having rejected the application of s. 102), it was not an order made under s. 102. Therefore, it was an interlocutory order, the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal from that order and leave to appeal it was required from the Divisional Court.
In Ontario (Transportation) v. J & P Leveque Bros. Haulage Ltd., the Court allowed an appeal from an order that dismissed an action as out of time pursuant to a contractual limitation period. The contract contemplated that a referee’s decision on any disputes between the parties would be made during the two-year contract. However, the referee’s decision was made outside those to years. The motion judge’s decision effectively immunized the referee’s decision from scrutiny because it was delivered later. The Court concluded that this outcome resulted in a commercial absurdity. It determined that since the referee’s decision was not made within the two years contemplated by the contract, the contractual limitation period did not apply at all and, instead, the statutory limitation period applied.
In Paradigm Change Consulting Inc. v. Boparai, the appellant persuaded the respondents (his parents and sister) to invest in various real estate schemes. The appellant fraudulently misrepresented the investment information and did not return most of the funds. The respondents obtained a Mareva injunction to prevent the sale of all the appellants’ assets. The motion judge also granted the respondents’ motion to amend their statement of claim and partial summary judgment and maintained the injunction. The appellants claimed that the motion judge erred in her decision and made reversible errors regarding evidence, credibility, and reasoning. The Court dismissed the appeal as having no merit and awarded substantial indemnity costs in favour of the respondents.
North House Foods Ltd. (Re) discussed in detail the application of s. 193 of the BIA to determine whether there is an appeal as of right or whether leave is required. A contractor sought leave to appeal the valuation at zero of its construction lien over the leasehold interest of the debtor that had made a proposal in bankruptcy. While leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was dismissed.
In Solmar Inc. v. Hall, the Court dismissed a motion by the Centre for Free Expression to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal from the dismissal of an anti-SLAPP motion.
In Galati v. Toews, the Court dismissed a prominent lawyer’s appeal from an order dismissing his defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions in s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act. The dispute related to public criticism of the lawyer’s handling of class action litigation against governments for COVID-19 pandemic policies, which resulted in the lawyer suing his critics.