Court of Appeal Summaries (January 12 – January 16)

Civil Decisions

Najm v. Najm, 2026 ONCA 13

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Equalization of Net Family Property, Excluded Property, Gifts, Fraudulent Conveyances, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Burden of Proof, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, ss. 4(2), 4(2)(1), 4(3), Najm v. Najm, 2017 ONSC 4777, Cronier v. Cusack, 2023 ONCA 178, Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518

Khorramrooz v. Baradar, 2026 ONCA 24

Keywords: Family Law, Support, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Perfection, Trans, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 61.05(5), 61.09(3-4), 61.13(1)(a), 61.13(3.1), 63.01(1), 63.02(1), 72.03(2)(c), Practice Direction Concerning Civil Appeals at the Court of Appeal for Ontario, s. 11.9.1., Abu-Saud v. Abu-Saud, 2020 ONCA 314, De Longte v. De Longte, 2025 ONCA 30, Carvalho Estate v. Verma, 2024 ONCA 222, D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37

Toronto-Dominion Bank v. 1871 Berkeley Events Inc., 2026 ONCA 22

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Receiverships, Civil Procedure, Stay Pending Appeal, Extension of Time, Leave to Appeal, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3, Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules, C.R.C. c. 368 (“BIA Rules”), r. 31(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 63.02(1)(b), r. 63.02(2), Carpenter v. Carpenter, 2016 ONCA 313, Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1, Shaver-Kudell Manufacturing Inc. v. Knight Manufacturing Inc., 2021 ONCA 202, Marshallzehr Group Inc. v. La Pue International Inc., 2025 ONCA 124, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Business Development Bank of Canada v. Pine Tree Resorts Inc., 2013 ONCA 282

Louie v. Han, 2026 ONCA 25

Keywords: Real Property, Resulting Trust, Partition and Sale, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, References, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time, Stay Pending Appeal, Partition Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.4, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 6.1(1)(b) and 19(1)(b), Practice Direction Concerning Civil Appeals at the Court of Appeal for Ontario (March 1, 2017), s. 11.3.1, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 51, 61.09, 63.01(1) and 63.02(1)(b), Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Rizzi v. Mavros, 2007 ONCA 350, 2650971 Ontario Inc. v. Shameti, 2021 ONCA 433, 2650971 Ontario Inc. v. Shameti, 2022 ONCA 62, Issai v. Rosenzweig, 2011 ONCA 112, UD Trading Group Holding PTE. Limited v. TransAsia Private Capital Limited, 2021 ONCA 279, Picavet v. Clute, 2012 ONCA 441, Fias v. Souto, 2015 ONSC 4140, Circuit World Corp. v. Lesperance (1997),33 O.R. (3d) 674 (C.A.), RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Fontaine v. Attorney General of Canada, 2020 CanLII 64770 (Ont. C.A.), Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 ONCA 749, Temagami (Municipality) v. Temagami Barge Limited, 2024 ONCA 859, Billimoria v. Mistry, 2022 ONCA 276, Webster v. Groszman, 2021 ONCA 55, Paulpillai Estate v. Yusuf, 2020 ONCA 655, Ontario Inc. v. Frezza, 2021 ONCA 822, Kakoutis v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2025 ONCA 715, Rosso v. Rosso, 2025 ONCA 822

Short Civil Decisions

West Whitby Landowners Group Inc. v. Elexicon Energy Inc., 2026 ONCA 15

Keywords: Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Jurisdiction, Standard of Review, Remedies, Certiorari, Costs

CIVIL DECISIONS

Najm v. Najm, 2026 ONCA 13

[van Rensburg, Miller and Sossin JJ.A.]

Counsel:

K. Maurina and S. Kirby, for the appellant

J. Robinson and C. Heidari, for the respondent

facts:

The parties SAN and FN, husband and wife respectively, married in Pakistan in 1985. They relocated to Ontario in 2000. Around March 2005, the couple experienced marital issues, and in October 2005, SAN signed a Talaq Nama Islamic divorce decree, of no legal effect in Canada. Shortly thereafter, SAN’s father swore a declaration in Pakistan respecting gifts he and SAN’s late mother had given to SAN. The declaration stated that the gifts were for SAN’s sole benefit and were not to become part of SAN’s net family property. Subsequently SAN changed his will to remove FN as a beneficiary.

In March 2006, SAN, his brother, and their father incorporated an Ontario real estate holding company, Safina Investments Inc. (“Safina”), operated by SAN and his brother, since SAN’s father was ill and in Pakistan. SAN’s father was issued 313 common shares in Safina and transferred 10 shares each to SAN and his brother. In July 2006, SAN’s father signed an affidavit in Ontario affirming the truth of his earlier gift declaration and made a will dividing his estate equally between his two sons. A term in the will precluded the application of Family Law Act (“FLA”) equalization rules to income and value increases in the inherited property. Upon his father’s death in July 2011, SAN received half of his father’s Safina shares valued at $530,000.

During a 12-day trial, SAN and FN each sought exclusions from their net family property pursuant to FLA s. 4(2). Some exclusions were accepted and some denied for each party. The trial judge rejected SAN’s claimed exclusion of his 50% shareholdings in Safina, holding that no documentary evidence corroborated that the father had provided the corporation’s original funding. He observed that SAN knew about the FLA exclusion rules when Safina was established and had a motive to structure his finances to evade future claims by FN, as evidenced by his religious divorce, the declaration SAN’s father signed, and SAN’s new will. SAN’s testimony that Safina was incorporated as part of his father’s inheritance plan was unconvincing, since it was unclear why the father personally needed to incorporate Safina when he could have just sent SAN funds for Ontario property investments. Ultimately, the trial judge ordered SAN to pay $353,752 in equalization to FN. SAN appealed, focusing on the denied exclusion for the Safina shares.

issues:

1.Did the trial judge err in law by requiring SAN to prove that his father was the source of the funds used to establish Safina?

2. Did the trial judge err by making unsupported findings based on speculative inferences?

3. Did the trial judge err in concluding that no documentary evidence linked the funding of Safina to the father?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. Courts can only intervene in the appeal of a financial order in a family law dispute where there is a material error, a grave misapprehension of evidence, or a legal error, none of which existed here. SAN submitted that the trial judge erroneously expanded on the FLA s.4(2) exclusion test by requiring that he prove an absence of fraud or misconduct intended to evade the FLA. Hence, in SAN’s view, the trial judge ignored his actual and legal control of the inherited shares and the documentary evidence confirming that the gratuitous transfers took place. SAN contended that unless a fraudulent conveyance was alleged and proven, courts should not look behind a properly documented gift when assessing a s.4(2) exclusion claim. The Court disagreed, holding that the lower court did not err in concluding that SAN failed to establish the Safina exclusion. The trial judge was justifiably concerned that SAN had purposefully arranged his affairs to insulate himself from his wife’s potential property claims. He made well-supported factual findings that SAN was incentivized to and in fact had taken steps to document assets as gifts from his parents but had failed to provide evidence linking money from his father to the subion for the Safina shares. Moreover, SAN’s own evidence lacked credibility and his expert witness merely traced assets using a chart prepared by SAN.

2. No. The Court rejected SAN’s complaint that the trial judge erred by speculating that SAN had transferred funds to his father to fund the Safina share subion, despite SAN’s testimony to the contrary. Again, the trial judge held the justifiable view that SAN ought to have been able to provide evidence that the share funding came from his father and thus could be the subject of a valid gift and inheritance. The absence of this evidence sharply contrasted virtually all of SAN’s other documented exclusion claims. Hence, the trial judge did not speculate but instead applied rules of evidence and SAN’s burden of proof in denying the claimed exclusion. Secondly, there was no merit to SAN’s submission that the trial judge acted inconsistently by denying his Safina exclusion claim and granting his exclusion claim for plots of vacant land in Pakistan, also gifted by SAN’s father. While SAN similarly did not produce evidence showing the origin of his father’s funds in buying the plots, the circumstances for these claims were entirely different.

3. No. An excerpt from SAN’s testimony and certain bank statements which he contended linked the funding of Safina to his father in fact did not. Moreover, it was too late for SAN to attempt to prove the source of the share funding based on documents in the record that were not addressed by SAN or his expert in their testimony about Safina.

Khorramrooz v. Baradar, 2026 ONCA 24

[Paciocco J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

S.K., acting in person

A.B., acting in person

facts

The motions at issue related to a final order in a family law dispute made on September 19, 2025. The material outcome of the trial was that A.B. owed S.K. an equalization payment, and S.K. owed A.B. a lump sum payment for retroactive child support in addition to monthly support on a going-forward basis.

Both A.B. and S.K. appealed the order and brought motions seeking a special directions dispensing with the need to serve and file trans as required by r. 61.09(3) and related relief.

S.K. also brought a motion in writing for a discretionary stay pursuant to r. 63.02 of the order related to child support, which directed she pay A.B. $734 per month going forward and a lump sum payment for retroactive child support of $62,466, which was to be deducted from the equalization payment A.B. owed to S.K. The child support order was based on imputed income after the trial judge found that S.K. did not provide sufficient evidence of her disability to justify her inability to work for the previous 13 years.

issues:

1. Should the tran requirements be dispensed with?

2.Should the support order be stayed pending appeal?

holding:

Motions dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. Given the nature of the issues raised, neither appeal could succeed without the trans, leaving the appeal hearings pointless. Given that the separation date and financial issues were the contested issues during the trial, and the appeal engaged the fairness of the trial, few if any of the trans would not be required. S.K. effectively acknowledged requiring all the trans and her grounds of appeal would require a complete set of trans. The Court further determined that the trans were necessary to fairly adjudicate both the appeals despite the parties’ claims of impecuniosity.

2. No. Orders for a payment of money are typically automatically stayed pending appeal, but those which relate to support orders are explicitly excluded from the automatic stay rule: r. 63.01(1). S.K. failed to persuade the Court that it was in the interests of justice to do so, nor would interim enforcement of the support order cause irreparable harm to S.K.

The Court was also unpersuaded that the balance of convenience favoured granting the motion. The trial judge found that the parties’ three children were dependents who resided with A.B. and that S.K. had made no child support payments since the parties’ separation in 2018. Therefore, the entire burden of maintaining the children had fallen for years on A.B. It was not in the best interest of the children to suspend the support payments pending appeal.

The appeals were ordered to be heard together and directed that the parties file a consolidated record containing the trans, with each party being responsible for half the cost of those trans.

Toronto-Dominion Bank v. 1871 Berkeley Events Inc., 2026 ONCA 22

[Paciocco J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

D.W., acting in person for the moving parties

T. C. Hogan & V. Adams, for the responding party msi Spergel Inc., in its Capacity as Receiver of 1871 Berkeley Events Inc., 1175484 Ontario Inc., 111 King Street East Inc., 504 Jarvis Inc. and Southline Holdings Inc.

No one appearing for the responding party, Toronto-Dominion Bank

facts:

On July 31, 2023, the respondents, who owned and operated an events center property, were placed under the control of a court‑appointed receiver, msi Spergel Inc. (the “Receiver”). The proceeding was heard in writing, and DW, a non‑lawyer, had leave to represent the corporate moving parties in both the Superior Court receivership and on the appeal before the Court.

On January 16, 2024, the Superior Court made an unopposed order authorizing the Receiver to sell the Property. After marketing the Property for close to two years, the Receiver entered into an agreement of purchase and sale on August 13, 2025 (the “APS”) and then moved for an approval and vesting order (the “AVO”) to permit the sale to close. Before the AVO motion, the Receiver disclosed confidential and commercially sensitive sale details to the moving parties, who then included those details in their public motion filings.

On October 28, 2025, Myers J. granted the approval and vesting order. He deferred to the Receiver’s business judgment under the Soundair principles. He found it reasonable for the Receiver to accept an unconditional offer that fell within a narrow range of three other offers. Those offers were obtained after responsible marketing efforts. There was no evidence of bad faith. The motion judge also concluded that the offers were a better indicator of current market value than earlier, higher appraisals.

The moving parties sought to appeal the October 28, 2025 order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”). They attempted to initiate an appeal by November 1, 2025. However, they mistakenly commenced it in the Divisional Court. On November 3, 2025, the Receiver’s counsel advised that the proper route of appeal was to the Court of Appeal.

An updated motion for leave to appeal was sent to the Court on December 4, 2025. The Registrar rejected it because it contained “too many deficiencies” to permit further correction and refiling. The Registrar directed DW to bring a motion for an extension of time. He did so on December 23, 2025. He also brought a motion for a stay of the approval and vesting order. Both motions came before Paciocco J.A. sitting as motions judge.

issues:

1. Should the Court grant an extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal, having regard to the factors governing extensions under Rule 31(1) of the BIA Rules?

2. Should the approval and vesting order be stayed pending appeal?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court was not satisfied that the justice of the case required an extension under Rule 31(1) of the BIA Rules, despite the moving parties’ intention to appeal within the ten-day period. The moving parties filed no proper affidavit evidence addressing the factual foundation required by the legal test. They offered only bald assertions of unspecified court-staff error. They also failed to provide a persuasive explanation for a delay that was almost four times the prescribed appeal period.

The delay caused concrete prejudice to the Receiver. The APS contained a condition precedent that would be breached by an appeal, or even a threatened appeal, that would prohibit or restrict closing. The Receiver continued to incur carrying costs while the sale remained unresolved. In addition, the moving parties publicly disclosed confidential pricing and marketing information, which would prejudice any re-listing if the APS failed to close.

The proposed appeal also lacked merit. Leave to appeal would likely be required, and granting leave would unduly hinder the insolvency process. The proposed issues were neither of general importance nor prima facie meritorious. The grounds of appeal reduced to assertions of procedural unfairness concerning counsel’s removal. These assertions lacked meaningful detail and could have been duplicative of a separate action. The moving parties also sought to reargue providence, contrary to the deference owed to the motion judge’s Soundair-based determinations.

2. No. The Court also dismissed the motion for a stay. Once the extension motion was refused, there was no appeal before the court. Appellate jurisdiction to grant a stay exists only where a motion for leave has been made, or an appeal has been taken. In any event, the stay would have been refused on the merits. The moving parties did not raise a serious issue. Any harm flowing from the sale would be compensable. The balance of convenience favoured the Receiver and the creditors, who would suffer non-compensable prejudice if the proceedings were further delayed.

Louie v. Han, 2026 ONCA 25

[Paciocco J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

LL, acting in person

J. Allingham, for the responding party

facts:

Ms. L and Mr. H’s relationship ended in 2012, and since 2021 they have been litigating disputes concerning two properties: a Markham townhouse registered in Ms. L’s name and a Toronto condominium owned jointly as tenants in common. Ms. L applied for an order selling the condo and dividing the proceeds, while Mr. H applied for a declaration that he held a 50% beneficial interest in the townhouse and for the sale of both properties with an accounting of contributions. In July 2025, the application judge declared Mr. H a 50% beneficial owner of the townhouse, ordered the sale of both properties under the Partition Act, and directed a reference to account for the parties’ respective contributions. Costs were later awarded against Ms. L on a substantial indemnity basis. Unknown to the court at the time, Ms. L had already entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for the townhouse, which led to subsequent consent orders facilitating the sale and payment of proceeds into court.

Ms. L filed multiple notices of appeal and brought a motion seeking extensive relief, including orders affecting the conduct of the reference, a stay of proceedings, expedition of the appeal, and directions regarding future proceedings in the Superior Court. Most of the relief sought was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or merit, but the Court granted an extension of time and deemed the appeal perfected, subject to payment of the required fee, finding that the delay was explained, caused no undue prejudice, and that the appeal was not so devoid of merit as to justify denying the right of appeal.

issues:

1. Did the Court of Appeal have jurisdiction over the various orders Ms. L sought to challenge, including the partition and sale orders, consent order, and procedural orders made in the reference?

2. Should Ms. L have been granted an extension of time and an order deeming her appeal perfected despite deficiencies and delay in complying with the perfection requirements?

3. Should the appeal have been expedited or the proceedings below stayed pending appeal?

4. Should the Court have granted directions affecting the conduct of the reference or future proceedings in the Superior Court?

holding:

Motion granted in part.

reasoning:

1. The Court only had jurisdiction over Order 1 that declared that Mr. H held a 50% beneficial interest in the townhouse. The Court emphasized that appellate jurisdiction in Ontario is order-specific and statute–driven, and that each order must be appealed to the correct court by the correct route. Although Ms. L attempted to challenge multiple orders in a single appeal, only the declaration in Order 1 that Mr. H held a 50% beneficial interest in the townhouse was a final order appealable as of right to the Court. The remaining aspects of Order 1, namely the orders for partition and sale and the direction for a reference, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Divisional Court under s. 7 of the Partition Act.

The Court further explained that Orders 2 and 3, which facilitated the townhouse sale and the handling of proceeds, were interlocutory consent orders and therefore required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court under ss. 6(1)(b) and 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act. Procedural rulings made by the associate judge during the reference process were not appealable to the Court at all but instead fell within the ongoing supervisory jurisdiction of the Superior Court under s. 17(a) of the Courts of Justice Act. As single motion judge of the Court could not finally determine jurisdiction, but warned that proceeding in the wrong court risked having the appeals quashed and directed that, if necessary, separate appeals should be commenced in the proper forums and only later combined by motion under s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

2. Yes. The Court granted an extension of time and deemed the appeal perfected because the interests of justice favoured doing so. Ms. L demonstrated a continuing intention to appeal, the delay was explained by her difficulty navigating the appellate rules as a self-represented litigant, and Mr. H would suffer no material prejudice beyond ordinary delay, particularly since the substantive orders were not stayed. Although the appeal appeared to face significant hurdles and some aspects likely fell outside the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court was not satisfied that the appeal was so lacking in merit as to justify denying the important right of appeal, especially where the challenge went to the central finding of beneficial ownership and the costs award.

3. No. The Court refused to expedite the appeal and denied a stay. There was no urgency warranting priority scheduling: the townhouse had already been sold, the condo sale and accounting would proceed through the reference, and the remaining live issue (beneficial ownership) was purely monetary and could be remedied later if necessary. Applying the stay test, Ms. L failed to show a serious issue with sufficient merit, irreparable harm (as proceeds were held in court), or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay; accordingly, expedition and a stay were not in the interests of justice.

4. No. The Court refused to grant any directions concerning the conduct of the reference or future proceedings in the Superior Court because it lacked jurisdiction to do so. Those matters fell within the authority of the associate judge and the Superior Court, and any concerns about compliance, procedure, or case management had to be raised in that forum or on a properly constituted appeal, not through a motion in the Court of Appeal.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

West Whitby Landowners Group Inc. v. Elexicon Energy Inc., 2026 ONCA 15

[Hourigan, Sossin and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C. Lee and K. Purba, for the appellant

L.M. Wagner, T. Markin and B. Taylor, for the respondent Elexicon Energy Inc.

M.P. Tunley and F. Yu, for the respondent Ontario Energy Board

Keywords: Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Jurisdiction, Standard of Review, Remedies, Certiorari, Cost.

Any article or other information or content expressed or made available in this Section is that of the respective author(s) and not of the OBA.

Court of Appeal Summaries (January 12 – January 16)

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Civil Decisions

Short Civil Decisions

CIVIL DECISIONS

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS