In October 2024, the Government of Ontario enacted the Reducing Gridlock, Saving Your Time Act, 2024. On November 21, 2024, the Ontario government introduced an amendment that would require the Minister of Transportation to remove three bike lanes on Bloor Street, Yonge Street, and University Avenue in the City of Toronto (the “Target Bike Lane Removal Provision”).[1] The impugned provision was part of a series of amendments to the Highway Traffic Act in which Ontario has, among other things, required that the City of Toronto seek provincial government approval prior to installing bike lanes that would reduce the number of lanes available for motor vehicle travel.
A non-profit cycling advocacy organization and two Toronto residents (the “Applicants”) brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the Ontario government from implementing the Target Bike Lane Removal Provision. The Applicants alleged that the provision unjustifiably infringed the rights of Toronto cyclists and other road users under section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) by exposing them to a heightened risk of serious injury or death.
In Cycle Toronto et al. v. Attorney General of Ontario et al.,[2] Justice Firestone of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the Applicants’ motion for an injunction prohibiting the removal of the Target Bike Lanes, without prejudice to a request for further injunctive relief.
Serious Issue to Be Tried
The Court applied the three-part test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-Macdonald in determining whether to grant injunctive relief. At the first stage of the analysis, the Court found that the Applicants met the “low threshold” of establishing that there was a serious issue to be tried as to whether removal of the bike lanes constituted state action that was capable of depriving individuals of their Charter rights.[3] Ontario relied on an exception to the general rule that a motion judge should not engage in an extensive review of the merits at this stage. Specifically, Ontario argued that the Applicants’ Charter claim raised a pure question of law which could be decided by the motion judge based on a review of the merits. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the Applicants’ claim was not one of those “exceedingly rare” cases where the constitutionality of legislation should be determined at a preliminary stage.[4]
The Court’s analysis at the first stage of the RJR test exposed the long-standing tension between positive rights and negative rights in the Charter context. The Applicants alleged that their claim fit within the traditional “negative rights” framework. Ontario, on the other hand, argued that there was no “deprivation” within the meaning of section 7 as the government had no constitutional obligation to provide bike lanes. The Court agreed with the Applicants that the “negative rights” framework was “at least a plausible framing of their argument” that could not be dismissed purely based on legal principles.[5]
Irreparable Harm to the Applicants
At the second stage of the RJR analysis, the Court concluded that the Applicants had established a “more than speculative” likelihood that cyclists would be exposed to a heightened risk of personal injury if the Target Bike Lanes were removed.[6] The Court rejected Ontario’s submission that any increased risk was not a result of the government’s decision to remove the bike lanes, but a consequence of people’s choices to continue cycling those routes when safer modes of transportation were available. The limited evidence before the Court showed that cycling is an “occupational necessity” for delivery workers in the City, and the availability of alternative means of transportation did not preclude a finding of irreparable harm.[7]
Balance of Convenience Weighed in Favour of Ontario
Under the third branch of the test, the Court held that the balance of convenience tipped in favour of Ontario, finding that the Applicants failed to provide a compelling public interest rationale to override the presumption that a validly enacted legislation serves the public interest. For the vast majority of cyclists, cycling is a mere choice, representing 3-4% of all trips made within the City, with even fewer people using the Target Bike Lanes. Moreover, any increased risk of harm would only be temporary, until the application was heard on its merits.[8]
Court Restrains Implementation of Provision Pending Release of Application Decision
The merits application was heard on April 16, 2025, and the decision was reserved. After the conclusion of the hearing, the Applicants renewed their request for an interlocutory injunction.
In a decision released on April 22, 2025, Justice Schabas granted an injunction suspending the operation of the Target Bike Lane Removal Provision until the release of his decision on the application.[9] Unlike Justice Firestone, the application judge had the benefit of the evidence and arguments presented by both parties.
Justice Schabas agreed with Justice Firestone’s serious issue finding and was bolstered in his conclusion by Ontario’s own evidence, which showed that the only information the government had at the time the provision was enacted raised concerns about whether the removal of the Target Bike Lanes would meet the government’s objective of reducing congestion.[10]
Justice Schabas similarly agreed with Justice Firestone that the Applicants would suffer irreparable harm, noting that the weight of the evidence on the application was that removal of the Target Bike Lanes may result in increased collisions and casualties.[11]
Justice Schabas departed from Justice Firestone’s conclusions at the balance of convenience stage of the analysis. Among other things, the government’s own evidence, which showed that the removal of the bike lanes would have little or no impact on the legislative objectives, considered alongside the Applicants’ expert evidence that more accidents and injuries would result, tipped the balance of convenience in favour of the Applicants. Additional considerations included the City’s public interest in expanding the use of bike lanes and the lack of evidence from Ontario regarding the expected timing of the demolition work.[12]
Conclusion
This case highlights the delicate balance between the government’s jurisdiction to impose legislation in the public interest against the potential impact on an individual’s Charter rights. As the Court held in The Neighbourhood Group et al. v. HMKRO, cited by the application judge in support of his decision to grant an injunction, “the government does not have a monopoly on the public interest”.[13] Likewise, in this case, the Applicants demonstrated a compelling and competing public interest sufficient to override the public interest objectives on which Ontario relied.
Less explicit but nonetheless evident in both the motion judge’s and the application judge’s decisions is the tension between provincial and municipal jurisdiction in making decisions that may interfere with the objectives of the other level of government. Here, the City of Toronto installed the Target Bike Lanes with the specific objective of reducing risk – an objective that conflicted with the Ontario government’s objective of reducing congestion in the city.
[5] Ibid at paras. 38, 42.
[6] Ibid at para. 59.
[7] Ibid at paras. 60-61.
[8] Ibid at paras. 80-82.
[9] Cycle Toronto et al. v. Attorney General et al., 2025 ONSC 2424.
[10] Ibid at para. 5.
[11] Ibid at para. 18.
[12] Ibid at para. 31.
[13] The Neighbourhood Group et al. v. HMKRO, 2025 ONSC 1934 at para. 50, cited in Cycle Toronto et al. v. Attorney General of Ontario et al., 2025 ONSC 2424 at para. 21.
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